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2SUMMARY
The authors, all staff members of the Japan East and Southeast Asia Research Cen-
tre at the Institute for World Economics (JESARC), outline their views on the re-
sponses to globalization by some of the main role players in the Far East. The
authors reflect their interpretations of globalization by employing various ap-
proaches in their analyses.
In Chapter 1, András Hernádi, senior research fellow and director of
JESARC, shows how Japan, the region’s biggest economy, has responded to the
challenges of globalization in an international context. In his view, the main fields
of reaction were in regionalism, management reforms, research and development,
and foreign policy.
The author of Chapter 2, Zoltán Bassa, research fellow, illustrates through
the cases of South Korea and Taiwan how smaller, export-oriented economies
have sought and found the right answers, i.e. appropriate government policies
and structural reforms.
In Chapters 3 and 4, Klára Mészáros, senior research fellow, and former
Hungarian ambassador to the People’s Republic of China, and András Székely-
Doby, research fellow, have put, understandably, more emphasis on the problems
related to the internal economies of China and India, respectively. In the world’s
two most populous, still less developed economies, the context and impacts of
globalization have appeared in somewhat different ways, thus calling for and re-
ceiving less direct responses.
Chapter 5, by Annamária Artner, senior research fellow, gives an account of
the criticisms of globalization made in Asia. She presents the thematic division of
anti-globalization organizations and movements and the coordination among
them, and shows that their mobilization capabilities are greater than their mem-
berships would suggest.




There is no need to define the term ‘global-
ization’ here in detail, as it has become one
of the most frequent terms in present-day
literature on the world economy. In the
author’s view, the two clearest signs of the
process have been the inexorable worldwide
advance of transnational corporations and
the unquestionable rise of the United States
to a position of military, technological, po-
litical and economic hegemony. As a conse-
quence of these two factors or perhaps as a
combination of them, the presence of Ameri-
can culture in its widest sense (i.e. in busi-
ness and management techniques, life styles,
fast-food restaurants, sporting activities,
films, pop music, etc.) have proliferated on a
global scale. Nevertheless, some basically
different civilizations,1 various international
organizations and patriotic feelings in many
nation-states have voiced strong criticism of
this. By the end of the 1990s, such criticism
had built up into an anti-globalization
movement, globalizing, so to speak, the de-
nial of globalization.
Even if this characterization is ac-
cepted, it remains crucial, in the author’s
view, to note that the process of globaliza-
tion has been accompanied by one of open
regionalization (in some cases only sub-
regionalization) and determination by na-
tion-states to retain and strengthen their
                                                
1 The term ‘civilization’ is employed here in the sense
used in Huntington, Samuel P (1996), The clash of
civilizations and the remaking of world order. New
York: Simon and Schuster.
identities. It will suffice here to refer to the
deepening and enlargement of the European
Union, and the enthusiastic attempts of some
countries greater (China, Russia, France and
Germany) and smaller (e.g. North Korea and
Cuba) to assert their sovereignty. In fact,
these accompanying features can be cited as
partial explanations for the birth of the anti-
globalization movement.
This chapter concentrates on where
Japan finds itself in this international set-up.
There is no doubt, Japan, with its deep-
rooted traditions, belongs to a non-western
civilization, and as an island state that chose
to isolate itself from the world for two-and-
a-half centuries up to 1868, may represent a
special case among nation-states. At the
same time, it has acted as a catalyst in the
Far East, for historical and geographical
reasons. Finally, the decade-long stagnation2
in its economy makes it even more tempting
to investigate its responses to the challenges
of globalization. However, this chapter omits
to deal with many aspects of its transforma-
tion and reforms, which are more concerned
with its domestic economy.
Japan’s primary response: back to trilateralism
Up to the late 1980s and the early 1990s,
politicians and economists alike would speak
of a multipolar (or most often tripolar)
world, in which Japan, along with its East
and Southeast Asian sphere of interest, rep-
resented one of the poles. The 1997–8 fi-
nancial crisis3 seems to have given a fatal
                                                
2 For a detailed treatment of the ‘lost decade’, see
Hernádi, András (2001), Crisis or transformation?
Japan viewed from Hungary. In: Hernádi, András,
and Makoto Taniguchi, Japan and Asia in a new
global age. Working Papers series 114. Budapest:
Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences.
3 The author, unlike many analysts and journalists,
cannot accept the term ‘Asian’ crisis. China and India
have hardly been influenced in their growth rates or
the stability of their currencies. Only Thailand, Indo-
nesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Korea have been
seriously hit.
6blow to terms like the East Asian miracle4,
often associated with the fast period of
growth in the countries of the region. The
figures suggest that the share of these coun-
tries in Japan’s total trade grew in the 1990s
by about 10 percentage points – from 30 to
40 per cent. At first glance, it looked as if
Japan had compensated itself for its loss of
weight in the world economy, resulting from
the negligible rates of growth in its GDP.
However, the partner countries could place
steadily decreasing reliance on the Japanese
market: the share of the East Asian NICs’ ex-
ports destined for Japan fell from 11 to 8 per
cent, and of the four major ASEAN countries’
from 23 to 16 per cent. Japan’s share in
their imports also declined, from 23 to 18
per cent and 26 to 22 per cent respectively.5
A similar trend appeared in their FDI in-
flows, with Japan’s share easing from the
25–40 per cent range to 7–25 per cent.6
This also reflects the coming of age of
these countries and diversification of their
systems of international relations, and could
well give them better chances of extending
regional cooperation. Almost all regional
schemes of cooperation in the area (ASEAN,
APEC, EAEC and PECC) have performed less well
than expected. Japan may try to strengthen
its regional position and the position of the
region in the world economy by building up
a system of bilateral free-trade agreements
(FTAs).7 In this respect, it may be helpful for
Japan that dialogue among ASEAN+3 (China,
Korea and Japan) has intensified and China’s
huge market has been brought into the in-
ternational economic system through its
membership of the WTO.
                                                
4 E.g. The East Asian miracle: economic growth and
public policy (1993). Washington DC: The World
Bank, Policy Research Department.
5 Author’s calculations based on Direction of Trade
Annual (IMF), various issues.
6 Author’s calculations based on World Investment
Directory, Asia and the Pacific (UN), various volumes.
7 For a recent summary of Japan’s regionalizing ac-
tivities, see Hook, Glenn D (2003), Japan in Region-
alisms. Social Science Japan, May, pp. 24–7.
As things stand, Japan has managed to
conclude an FTA only with Singapore.8
Much remains to be done with Korea, Ma-
laysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Mexico,
Chile, Canada and Australia, mainly due to
strong opposition from some Japanese farm-
ers. Nevertheless, they too will have to come
to terms with the idea if they want, on a na-
tional level, to give Japanese products and
services better market access. FTAs based on
a principle of mutuality serve Japan’s inter-
ests by imposing foreign competition on
Japanese businesses, so enhancing rivalry at
home and with counterparts in third coun-
tries.
Reinstatement of closer ties with East
and Southeast Asian countries, especially
China, should also give new momentum to
Japan’s economy. The strategy of escaping
outwards, however, deserves attention not
just in the case of Japan. It may equally be
one of the global engines, having remained
in neutral gear for quite a while. If Japan,
through its regional activity, succeeds in
giving a new impetus to the third pole in the
world economy, the whole international
community may benefit. This seems in-
creasingly realistic in view of current and
forecast growth rates in these countries
(reckoning also with the effects of SARS).9
Finally, it is also interesting to note that
no matter how hard Japan tries to retain its
longstanding priority for internationaliza-
tion, tradition-keeping and patriotism are
constant forces in everyday life. The latest
debate on revising the basic education law,
for example, centred on whether the phrase
                                                
8 Although concluded in January 2002, the agree-
ment came into force only in November. It took only
a few months for the United States then to sign a
similar treaty with Singapore, the first between the
United States and an Asian country. As both economic
superpowers aim to extend their FTAs to ASEAN, their
officials make no secret out of their intention of using
such agreements to offset the present and future im-
pact of China’s trade offensive in the region. See, for
instance, Delays on FTAs could cost Japan, The Nikkei
Weekly, May 19, 2003, p. 18; Engaging the US with
trade, Far Eastern Economic Review, May 22, 2003,
pp. 18–19.
9 See, for instance, The Economist poll of forecasters,
The Economist, May 3, 2003, p. 98.
7‘love of the country’ should be changed to
‘patriotism’.10 The same tendencies appear
in the increasing stress on the importance of
the nation. Observers believe ‘globalization
is a game in which stronger nations prevail
while weaker ones lose. Globalization means
intensified competition among nations,
rather than diminished national borders and
sovereignty. That is different from interna-
tionalization.’11 Policy-makers have also
started to incorporate such views in some
government documents and reports. Yet  re-
assuringly, these comments and propositions
are not designed to foment nationalism, but
rather to call for enhancement of the coun-
try’s international competitiveness. The Nik-
kei Weekly has pointed out in an editorial
that ‘the alarmist talk indicates how Japan
has so far avoided truly facing the relentless
forces of economic globalization, despite all
the heated debates on the effects of global-
ization in the past several years.”12 In an in-
terview in the same issue, Hiroshi Okuda,
chairman of Toyota Motor, pointed a finger
when saying what should be done to help
Japan turn out more creative products and
technologies: ‘The education system must be
changed. When mass production was the
norm in the economy, it was enough to pro-
duce workers who were more or less like
machines. But from now on, we need an
education system that nurtures creativity in
our children.”13
                                                
10 Nishida Mutsumi (2003), Time ripe to review basic
education law. The Nikkei Weekly, May 12.
11 Ishizuka, Masahiko (2003), Nationalistic sentiment
staging comeback, Ibid., May 5.
12 Creativity essential in global competition (2002).
Ibid., January 14.
13 Absence of fighting spirit, creativity failing econ-
omy. Ibid. Although not in so essential a field, a
young Japanese, Takeru Kobayashi won fame by set-
ting world hot dog-eating records in 2001 and 2002.
Kobayashi, weighing less than 60 kg before the com-
petition, ate 50½ hot dogs in 12 minutes. The runner
up, a 200-kg New Yorker, managed only 26. The
Economist, July 13, 2002, p. 42.
Management reforms: from macro to micro level
Former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori said in
his inauguration speech, ‘The system and the
ways of thinking which for 50 years have
supported Japan’s astonishing development
have now become inappropriate for the
world we live in.’ Junichiro Koizumi, who
took over a year later, used the word ‘re-
form’ almost 40 times in his inaugural
speech. Even if it was unclear what he spe-
cifically intended to reform, the agenda was
set by a decade of reformist talk in the Japa-
nese media: deregulation, an end to lifetime
employment, unwinding of cross-
shareholdings, and pay and promotion on
merit, not seniority.14
At present, the Japanese are in no
mood for preserving institutions out of any
sense of being ‘Asiatic’. For most people, be-
ing ‘Asiatic’ is seen as a kind of backward-
ness that contrasts starkly with American
modernity.15 There seems to be a pendulum
movement. American management methods
were considered supreme all over the world
up to the late 1960s. Then up to the middle
of the 1980s, the yardstick was Japanese
(perhaps even ‘Asiatic’) management. Now it
is the turn of American methods again.
Koizumi appointed as deregulation
minister Nobuteru Ishihara, the son of a re-
formist governor of Tokyo.16 Ishihara has
given special attention to better use of Japa-
nese technology. On a number of occasions,
he has noticed and addressed the fact that
Japanese technological innovations work
more efficiently abroad, free from the ex-
                                                
14 This is pointed out in Dore, Ronald (2002), Will
global capitalism be Anglo-Saxon capitalism? Asian
Business and Management 1:1, p. 15.
15 Ibid., p. 17.
16 The father, Shintaro Ishihara, claimed in an elec-
tion speech in April 2003, ‘Because the central gov-
ernment does nothing, the metropolitan government
will have to act.’ Quoted in The Nikkei Weekly, April
21, 2003.
8cessive regulations in Japan.17 But deregula-
tion in a wider sense became a catchword
for reformist politicians, economists and
business people during the ‘lost decade’, and
administrative restrictions (non-tariff barri-
ers) have long been blamed at home and
abroad. This chapter cannot cover the in-
numerable measures proposed or introduced
(wholly or half-heartedly) to reform the
Japanese banking and financial system, but
it is instructive to look at some of the
changes affecting management at corporate
level.
The first to mention is the 2002
amendment of the Commercial Code, which
was designed to make the board of directors
the key to ensuring the efficacy of govern-
ance and give outside directors (at least
three of them) a crucial role on the board.18
All members of the board were to have free
access to information. One of the famous
corporations to have applied the new system
was Sony, which even appointed a foreigner,
Carlos Ghosn, the renown ‘borrowed-from-
Renault’ president of Nissan Motor Co., as
one of its outside directors.19 It appears that
Japanese companies have started to shift
                                                
17 See, for instance, Set our gizmos free (2003). The
Economist, May 24, p. 55.
18 This change, along with new accounting regula-
tions, was aimed at increasing the trust of foreign
investors in the soundness or intended soundness of
Japanese corporations. Japanese business people often
blame China’s huge capacity to absorb capital for
diverting foreign interests from Japan. The number of
Japanese working for foreign firms operating in Ja-
pan has just passed one million, or 2.3 per cent of the
workforce. ‘In general, foreign firms in Japan attract
people whose talents are either under-rewarded or
allowed to waste away in local companies. That ap-
plies especially to women… despite high education
levels are in much less rewarding white-collar jobs
than their western counterparts’ The Economist, Oc-
tober 26, 2002, p. 64.
19 Tatsuya Tamura (2003), Disciplining companies
with the rules of capitalism. Focus Japan, January-
February, pp. 10–11; Goto, Michio (2003), Sony
forges ahead on board reform. The Nikkei Weekly,
May 5, p. 10. An even more striking breakthrough
happened in the Japanese Diet on February 8, 2002,
when Marutei Tsurunen of the opposition Demo-
cratic Party took his place in the upper house, be-
coming the first person from a Western country to sit
in the Japanese legislature. (Finnish-born, he was
naturalized in 1979.) Far Eastern Economic Review,
February 21, 2002, p. 13.
from stakeholder to shareholder-oriented
management, imitating once again their
American counterparts. Another new trend
is to appoint younger, 45 to 55-year-old ex-
ecutives as president-cum-chief executives,
as if to reflect a change from seniority to
performance-based promotion.20
As a rule, though, ‘the country’s na-
tional character of shying away from radical
change’ is apparent, so that ‘drastic reforms
would be too much for the Japanese people
to deal with and the only possible course
was slow and gradual change.’21 Another
expert on corporate strategy  has suggested
that ‘Japan must move beyond just quality
competition to competing on strategy and
innovation. Japanese companies will need to
develop distinctive strategies that result in
superior, sustainable profitability. In order
to do so, incremental improvements in best
practice will not be enough. Genuine inno-
vation not only in products but also in ap-
proaches to competing will be required. As
shown in earlier periods of transition, if
mind-sets change, Japan has the capacity to
move rapidly. A new national movement of
no less significance than the quality move-
ment is needed.’22
IT and R & D
By the end of the 1990s, Japanese politicians
and experts were well aware that Japan’s
technological strength was ebbing. Some
even spoke of a crisis: ‘The deathly damage
suffered by Japanese companies lies in the
fact that they are not competitive in the
fields of information and communication
technology, which create the bases of the
next industrial revolution.’23 If it is consid-
                                                
20 Younger managers rising to the top (2003). The
Nikkei Weekly, April 28, p. 10.
21 Miyamoto, Noriyoshi (2002), Benefits and limita-
tions of Japanese-style management. The Japan Eco-
nomic Review, December 15, p. 6.
22 Takeuchi, Hirotaka (2003), Yes, Japan can change.
Focus Japan, March, pp. 10–11.
23 Atsuro, Kokubo (1999), Gijutsu taikoku Nippon no
9ered that the term ‘crisis’ in Japanese com-
bines the characters for ‘danger’ and ‘op-
portunity’, it becomes apparent why it is
spoken of so often. Calling attention to a
danger necessarily emphasizes the problem-
solving opportunities it presents.
Countless economic and political
analyses have stated that one of the main
factors behind Japan’s post-war economic
success was the introduction and spread of
technologies. Support for R&D has long been
a crucial element of economic policy, but as
the growth rate slowed in the 1990s, the
funds available started to diminish, although
the GDP share of R&D expenditures re-
mained about 3 per cent, which was consis-
tently higher than in competing countries.
Even in absolute terms, only the United
States managed greater R&D expenditures
(about double), while Germany’s were about
a third of Japan’s at the end of the decade.
Furthermore, More of Japan’s R&D spending
was on efficient private and non-military
projects, which went some way to compen-
sate for a smaller budget than the American
one in absolute terms. (The share of private
sector R&D expenditure in Japan in 2000
was 77.9 per cent, as opposed to 66.8 per
cent in the United States in 1999.)24 Japan’s
international position in 2001 in the instal-
lation of industrial robots was still remark-
able: more than a third of the world total
(28,300 out of 78,100), with a stock of
361,000, which was still almost half of the
world’s.25 In IT, Japanese spending jumped
in 2001 from 3.9 per cent to 4.4 per cent of
GDP, but remained lower than the propor-
tion of 5.2 per cent in the EU and 5.3 per
cent in the United States.26
In 1995, the government devised a
long-term development plan designed to
turn Japan into a scientific and technological
powerhouse. It allocated for R&D the
                                                                          
kiki. Voice, October.
24 R&D. Weekly Window (2002). The Nikkei Weekly,
December 31, 2001–January 7, p. 17.
25 Robots (2002). The Economist, October 26, p. 104.
26 IT in Japan: Watching the world scroll by (2003).
Ibid., April 19, p. 55.
equivalent of about USD 150 billion a year
up to 2000, and about USD 200 billion a
year through to 2005. Although signs of
catching up or keeping pace with American
and European rivals appeared, there were
criticisms of the programme from academics
and the media, arguing that state-of-the-art
devices were being purchased at great ex-
pense, but other factors, such as training in
using the equipment properly, were lagging
behind. Universities on government funding
were said to lose interest in corporate ties
and funding: ‘It is time for the national gov-
ernment to shift from its conventional
method of scattering technological develop-
ment projects throughout an industry to one
that focuses on particular companies
through competitive bids to nurture global
players,’ wrote one paper. ‘The business
start-up rate from 1999 through 2001 was
3.1 per cent, about half the level of the
1970s and lower than the 4.5 per cent liq-
uidation rate… The government must estab-
lish a system to fund start-ups.’27
The government has in fact outlined a
plan for a thousand venture-capital firms, in
which universities would join forces with
private business. Schemes have recently
been announced by the Osaka, Keio, Tokyo,
Waseda and Hokkaido universities. The De-
velopment Bank of Japan has invested in
campus-based start-ups, and analysts now
believe the financial backing for the gov-
ernment’s target is in place.28 Another move
towards IT development has been the attrac-
tion of growing numbers of foreign systems
engineers, mainly from other parts of Asia.
This too has received support from a gov-
ernment plan that envisages increasing the
number of foreign IT experts in the country
from the present few thousand to 30,000
over a period of years.29
                                                
27 Goto, Yasuhiro (2003), No high road to R & D
power status. The Nikkei Weekly, May 19, p. 7.
28 Academia warms to idea of tying up with business
(2003). Ibid., March 10, pp. 1–19; High tech aban-
doning ivory tower (2003). Ibid., April 7, p. 11.
29 Imports of systems engineers on rise (2002). Ibid.,
September 30, p. 9.
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In a country with among the longest of
life expectancies, it has been considered a
waste of human resources for professors and
researchers to retire at the age of 63. Al-
though a number of methods have been ap-
plied to get round this regulation (the sim-
plest being to change one’s full-time job for
another, usually part-time one, or to accept
contract assignments, honorary posts, etc. in
Japan or abroad), a real change will have to
come from legislation. This need has been
felt and even anticipated by the University of
Tokyo, which decided to change its retire-
ment age from 60 to 65. But instead of im-
plementing the new rule right away, it is
raising it by one year every three years, so
phasing in the process over 15 years.30
Changes are slow, but they continue,
in the field of e-government as well. Domes-
tic internet access in 2002, at just over 40
per cent, was fourth among the G7 countries
after the United States, Canada, and Britain.
Use of e-government services in 2001, at
somewhat less than 20 per cent, was one
from last, behind only Britain’s share of
about 10 per cent.31 Japanese anxieties
about possible leakage of databases or the
chance of national-identity numbers stray-
ing elsewhere are among the factors making
a breakthrough difficult in this respect.32
The Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry, in a two-pronged approach of en-
couraging both innovation and good cor-
porate governance, has raised an initial allo-
cation equivalent to USD 1 million to almost
25 times as much for fostering a more en-
trepreneurial spirit in research laboratories.
Electronics firms such as Hitachi, Matsu-
shita, Fujitsu and NEC are sending chief en-
gineers and heads of R&D heads on ‘man-
agement of technology (MOT)’ courses,
                                                
30 Kruger, David (2003), Past their use-by dates. Far
Eastern Economic Review, May 23, pp. 32–4.
31 E-government: No thanks, we prefer shopping
(2003). The Economist, January 4, p. 29.
32 There’s always someone looking at you – and the
people don’t like it (2002). Ibid., August 10, p. 47.
considered as MBA courses for engineers to
brush up business skills.33
The international arena and war in Iraq: limited
responses and responsibilities
Bad times often bring to the fore differences
of opinion in international affairs. France
and Germany showed opposition to the US
plans to wage war on Iraq, mainly for do-
mestic reasons, while the opposition of
China and Russia had more to do with their
global power positions. As the relatively
short military campaign gave way to politi-
cal and economic reconstruction in Iraq, it
became apparent that there were some shifts
in US foreign relations. France, and to a
lesser degree Germany, still face coolness.
Qatar is enjoying approval rather than Saudi
Arabia, while Poland and NATO applicant
Romania may play new roles based on their
strategic positions and lower cost levels.
China has sought to make up for its attitude
over the war by mediating in US-North Ko-
rean talks and sending out a special Middle-
East envoy to discuss the ‘road map’ with
Israeli and Palestine politicians.
Japan, the foremost US ally in Asia, re-
ceived an indirect boost when Prime Minis-
ter Junichiro Koizumi visited Tony Blair in
London. His warm welcome can be ex-
plained by the Japanese prime minister’s ac-
tive support for the US intervention in Iraq
and his firmness on another ‘bad boy’ in in-
ternational affairs, North Korea. (South Ko-
rea, incidentally, has offered to send non-
combat forces for reconstruction work in
Iraq.) The Japanese reassurances, like the
offer of USD 100 million for emergency
humanitarian aid and financial assistance to
help rebuild Iraq, seem to have worked well
politically for Koizumi, at a time of domestic
economic difficulties. (Japan’s USD 450 bil-
lion are by far the world’s biggest official
foreign-currency reserves and the offer was
                                                
33 Japanese innovation: redesigned (2003). Ibid., June
14, p. 70.
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within its capabilities.)34 It should also be
remembered that current Japanese law pre-
cludes sending self-defence force (SDF)
personnel without consent from the receiv-
ing country.35
Responses to SARS and computer viruses
When SARS (severe atypical respiration syn-
drome) appeared, it was soon being de-
scribed as an ‘Asian disease’. Although the
epidemic started in China, the term was in-
appropriate. For instance, only one of the
more than 1 billion inhabitants of India had
contracted SARS by the end of April 2003.
Japan (population almost 130 million) had
the same number of cases – two – as Sweden
(population 9 million), which was fewer
than Germany, Britain, France or Italy.
In a country like Japan, long associated
with non-tariff barriers, administrative im-
migration controls at international airports
are no surprise to foreign visitors. This may
be why Japan was able to keep SARS carriers
at bay, along with the high standard of
medical services and general compliance
with sanitary and hygiene regulations.
Nevertheless, Japan’s estimated losses
through SARS have been quite high. Any ad-
ditional uncertainty in a period of persistent
economic stagnation has a multiplying im-
pact. The war in Iraq restrained the Japanese
from going abroad, but the SARS news and
the recommendations made issued by vari-
ous official forums have made many Japa-
nese to cut their travel plans for this year’s
Golden Week. At the same time, foreigners
cancelled a great number of air tickets and
hotel room reservations for Japan. Inward
                                                
34 Official reserves (2003). Ibid., March 24, p. 99.
35 None of the three defense bills passed by the Lower
House of the Japanese Diet on May 15, 2003, has
made any proposal to change the law in this respect.
One bill addressed the response to armed aggression,
another revised the existing law governing the SDF,
and the third concerned the establishment of a na-
tional security council in the event of an emergency.
(The Nikkei Weekly, May 19, 2003, p. 2.)
tourism, having surpassed 5 million for the
first time in 2002, will have fallen back in
2003, and the number of Japanese travelling
abroad is expected to be more than 14 mil-
lion, after 18 million in 2000 and 16.2 mil-
lion in 2001 (affected by the September 11
attack).36
The slowdown in tourism receipts (and
expenditures) will affect GDP in 2003 by
only 0.01 percentage points smaller, hardly
altering the estimated growth rate of 0.8 per
cent. But severe competition will continue in
various segments of the Japanese market, as
consumers with per capita incomes equiva-
lent to over USD 30,000 are at stake. Japa-
nese consumers are famous for their enthu-
siasm for new, foreign (preferably American
and Western European) products,37 even if
they already have equivalent consumer dur-
ables in the home. In 2002, almost 100 per
cent of such households had washing ma-
chines, colour television sets, vacuum clean-
ers and refrigerators, over 80 per cent mi-
crowave ovens, air conditioners, cars and
video recorders, and almost 80 per cent mo-
bile phones. With PCs, however, the market
is divided. Almost 85 per cent of households
with an annual income equivalent to USD
100,000 have PCs, but only 25 per cent of
those with incomes below the equivalent of
USD 25,000 level, giving a national average
of slightly over one household in two.38
Perhaps the fullest advantage of the PC
revolution in Japan has been enjoyed by
computer viruses, for 24,000 infections
were registered by the IT Promotion Agency
of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and In-
dustry in 2000. (Since 1990, PC owners in
Japan have to report virus infections.) Busi-
nesses specialized on computer security suc-
                                                
36 Figures are from the Japan National Tourist Asso-
ciation quoted in The Nikkei Weekly, April 29, 2002,
p. 17; May 6, 2002, p. 17; and February 10, 2003, p.
17.
37 For a detailed, area-related analysis of new Japa-
nese products, see Hernádi, András (2000), Japan’s
positions in the international technological competi-
tion. Budapest: Institute for World Economics, mimeo
(in Hungarian.)
38 Figures from the Cabinet Office quoted in The Nik-
kei Weekly, May 13, 2002, p. 17.
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cessfully cut the figure to 20,350 by 2002
and the proportion of damaging infections
fell to 8 per cent, compared with 80 per cent
in 1998.39 As if to supplement market com-
petition, the Japanese government plans to
scare away virus launchers and other cyber-
criminals by setting up a new legal frame-
work. For the time being, they can face a
prison sentence of up to three years.40
Concluding words
It can be seen that Japan still excels in
adapting to change, even if present slower
growth rates slow its reactions to outside
challengers. The increasing presence of for-
eigners and international influences give
reforms otherwise difficult to introduce
greater acceptability in a tradition-conscious
society, especially if they are gradual rather
than sudden.
2) SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN FACE
THE CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION
(Zoltán Bassa)
Introduction
South Korea and Taiwan have been widely
regarded as successes, due to their export-
led growth, high savings and investment
rates, and good education policies. The
South Korean economy was severely hit by
the financial turmoil of 1997, although the
impact on Taiwan was milder, where a
negative growth rate in 2001 occurred for
                                                
39 Figures from the IT Promotion Agency quoted in
The Nikkei Weekly, March 24, 2003, p. 17.
40 Ibid.
different reasons. While strong criticism of
local economic policies and structures have
suddenly been appearing, globalization has
also been advanced as an explanation for the
1997–8 crisis and subsequent situation. The
definition of globalization is also debated. In
this chapter, it is understood as an accelera-
tion of international trade and capital flows
(the latter at a higher pace) with the trans-
nationals as engines, coupled with neo-
liberal ideology and policies focused on lib-
eralizing trade, investment and finances,
imposing restrictive policies, and conducting
privatization. With structural economic re-
forms, most governments in the world fa-
vour the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism
and globalization.
South Korea
In 1997–8, South Korea experienced a fi-
nancial shock that spread through its whole
economy. The wide impact was also due to
government policy of introducing IMF-
inspired restrictive measures, including high
interest rates that drove many companies
into insolvency and caused mass redundan-
cies. The positive consequences of this policy
were debated as well. The exchange rate was
stabilized, but only after a steep fall. The
current account showed a surplus in 1998,
but the reason was a sharp decline in im-
ports, rather than any increase in exports.
Globalization in the sense of neo-liberal
policies has come to dominate in South Ko-
rea. In fact, most local commentators and
people in general called this the ‘IMF era’,
although the South Korean president agreed
to the measures and the government exe-
cuted them in conjunction with IMF-
appointed foreign staff in some ministries.
This approach was abandoned in May
1998 with the consent of the IMF, but it is
understood as a form of globalization chal-
lenge. There are several reasons for the rela-
tively soft approach taken by the IMF. First,
it was facing tough opposition from trade
unions and from local company owners and
managers, pursuing workers’ interests and
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nationalist sentiments. There came to be
criticism of the experts even inside the IMF
and the World Bank. Secondly, South Korea
is not a Third World country, but a middle-
ranking global economic power with OECD
membership and ambitious, able diplomats.
Thirdly, possible political (not just eco-
nomic) turmoil would have destabilized the
whole Korean peninsula, which was already
insecure because of North Korea. Thus this
dimension of globalization was curbed by
local and regional interests.
Structural reforms, rather than shock
therapy, became the focus of policy in the
second half of 1998, once again with IMF
support. From the viewpoint of globaliza-
tion, an important structural reform was the
1998 liberalization of FDI and portfolio in-
vestment. Foreign investors took advantage
of this and of the fact that many local firms
had become cheap enough to buy. The years
1998–2000 saw an unprecedented wave of
FDI in the financial and manufacturing sec-
tors and portfolio investment also rose.
Nowadays, foreign investors own 36 per
cent by value of the equity quoted on the
main stock exchange, compared with 15 per
cent before the crisis.41
However, foreign investors were un-
able to buy whole company groups, because
of their size, structural complexity and rigid
systems of family control. What they occa-
sionally did was to buy group members
(Daewoo Motors went to GM, Samsung
Motors to Renault, and Samsung’s construc-
tion equipment company to Volvo) or start
joint ventures (Philips and LG). Apart from
providing a welcome capital injection, such
deals helped to maintain or develop the
global marketing of South Korean products,
or offered technological tie-ups. In most
cases, foreign capital chose companies al-
ready present on the global market. The tar-
gets for investment were Korean transna-
tionals with or without financial difficulties,
but definitely with previous good records in
marketing, design or other fields. For even
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before the crisis, South Korea was strongly
integrated into the world economy through
manufacturing exports. Globalization here
does not open new markets so much as im-
pact on ownership structures and manage-
ment practices.
The South Korean manufacturing sec-
tor is far from being bought up entirely by
foreigners. The most capital in value terms
has gone into the services sector (including
financial services). Consolidation of several
large commercial banks has been financed
out of the public purse through nationaliza-
tion, but in other cases, foreign capital has
been injected instead.42 Later, foreign in-
vestors acquired shares in the nationalized
banks as well. This was the biggest symbolic
breakthrough with globalization, as foreign
capital had traditionally been absent from
the banking sector. New foreign firms and
local affiliates were started in financial and
business services as well, where South Ko-
rean companies are inexperienced or un-
competitive. Greenfield investment has been
more usual in the services, as local managers
do not favour having a foreign stake in their
firms, especially in finance. Many foreign
firms have bought non-performing loans at
deep discounts, with an aggregate face value
of some USD 9.13 billion. Korean debt bro-
kers began to appear in 1999, as a response
to the globalization of finance encouraged
by the government through tax and invest-
ment incentives.43 This exemplifies South
Korean management and officialdom trying
to reap the benefits of globalization, rather
than setting out alternative policies designed
to avert its impact. Nationalism, local capi-
tal, entrepreneurship and ability to learn
new trades are major ways in which local
South Korean businesses are benefiting from
globalization.
Steps were taken during the crisis to
liberalize trade further. The most important
was to remove some barriers to imports of
                                                
42 There was a relatively good basis for this, as foreign
debts (in bank hands) had been rescheduled by early
1998, with funding and consent from the IMF, in
exchange for the policy measures mentioned earlier.
43 Far Eastern Economic Review, May 8, 2003, p. 43.
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Japanese goods and services, so that Japan
overtook the United States as the biggest
source of imports in 2000. Total exports rose
by 22.7 per cent in USD terms between
1998 and 2002, while imports increased by
61.3 per cent, which gradually eroded the
trade and current-account surpluses of
1998. It would be tempting to cite this
against the trade liberalization inherent in
globalization, but a similar pattern of higher
growth for imports than for exports ante-
dates the crisis, while imports (and domestic
demand) started from very low levels in
1998. South Korean firms still depend on
imports of capital goods to the same extent
as before the crisis.
The large company groups known as
chaebol have come under pressure to
streamline their activities, push down their
debt-to-equity ratios to 200 per cent, di-
minish cross-financing inside company
groups, and strengthen shareholders’
rights.44 These requirements are modelled
on Anglo-Saxon capitalism and show the
influence of the US-dominated IMF and
other global institutions. It has to be noted
that most South Korean decision-makers
have earned their PhDs in the United States,
from where they return in growing num-
bers. Japan, the original model of South Ko-
rean capitalism, retains only a skeleton of its
influence in several spheres.
Privatization is also part of the reform
package. A plan was made during the crisis
to privatize almost all major firms, that were
wholly state-owned, mainly the utilities,
steel-makers and heavy industrial compa-
nies, Korea Telecom, and the tobacco and
ginseng monopolies. By early 2003, several
had been privatized and foreign firms al-
lowed to buy in. The electric power and gas
utilities have yet to be privatized, due to
strong opposition from workers.
                                                
44 By 2002, the largest chaebols had been split (Dae-
woo and Hyundai) and/or had reduced the number
of their affiliates (many of which went bankrupt be-
fore any measures were taken.) It took four years for
the three largest groups to reduce their debt-to-
equity ratios to around 200 per cent. Intra-group
financial activities and shareholder relations change
less quickly.
South Korea is not simply moved or
shaken by globalization. It is also a mover
and shaker of global trends through its
transnational companies, usually chaebols.
FDI by them fell back in 1998–9, but recov-
ered in 2000. The successors of those that
were broken up have continued to invest
abroad since finalizing their restructuring
processes in 2001–2. The focus now is on
China, as a market growing much faster
than either the United States or European
countries and offering low wages and high
profitability. In fact, the biggest US and
European affiliates of Korean firms were
showing losses by 2001 or 2002. The focus
of investment is on manufacturing (headed
by electronics and telecom equipment) and
trade. Unlike foreign direct investors from
more developed countries, Korean firms sel-
dom perform mergers or make acquisitions.
South Korea’s ambitions to become a regional
centre
One response to globalization that has ap-
peared recently in South Korean decision-
making circles is an aspiration to make the
country a business, financial, logistics, high-
tech or information hub in North East Asia.
It is a reasonable idea to strengthen the role
of the non-manufacturing sector, for South
Korea has already lost competitiveness to
China and other developing countries in
non-high-tech sectors. The arguments for
becoming an information hub are also well
grounded, as the well-developed informa-
tion networks make the country ‘the third
largest internet-using population in the
world,’45 containing the world’s largest
maker of mobile phones (Samsung), which
conducts sizeable R&D into application
technologies for IT. South Korea’s geo-
graphical location is also favourably close to
China, Japan and Russia with ‘43 major
Asian cities with populations of at least one
million within a three-hour radius of
                                                
45 Korean Business Review, April 2003, p. 10.
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Seoul.’46 A new airport has recently opened
near Seoul and high-speed trains are to run
from Seoul to various cities from 2004. In
terms of ports and tankers, there is no bot-
tleneck to the country’s aspirations. There
are more difficulties with the ambitions to
become a financial centre. The stock ex-
change in Seoul is rated as mediocre in the
Far East. Investors’ confidence is vulnerable
and evaporates easily when there is any
threat from North Korea or from local finan-
cial scandals. Reform of the financial sector
has created conditions for a wider range of
companies in financial services, but the pro-
cess has only just started. The government
idea of connecting the regional-hub strategy
with sub-regional cooperation in North East
Asia is far from new, but earlier efforts
proved unsuccessful. The North Korean
leadership does not want to open up. China,
Japan and Russia would be more interested
in taking part in sub-regional cooperation if
North-South relations on the Korean pen-
insula improved. In the event, there was a
two-year halt after the promising summit
meeting in June 2000.
Taiwan
The financial crisis that affected some coun-
tries in the region so deeply did not have a
significant impact on Taiwan’s macroeco-
nomic situation. The growth rate fell only
slightly, from 6.7 per cent in 1997 to 4.6
per cent in 1998.47 Exports were hit, but
domestic investment and consumption in-
creased. The currency devaluation and fall
in the stock market were less severe than in
South Korea. What were the reasons? First
and most importantly, Taiwan did not have
weak points to make it vulnerable to a sud-
den change in financial flows. The country
had huge foreign currency reserves (based
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(2002). The Hankook Ilbo, November 14. Reprinted
in Korea Focus, January-February 2003, p. 30.
47 Taiwan’s macroeconomic data are taken from the
country’s official source: www.stat.gov.tw.
on continuous current-account surpluses
over several years) and virtually no foreign
debt. Parallel with financial liberalization,
the state retained considerable controls and
regulation over capital flows. This made it
difficult for banks to raise credit abroad,
which the state itself also avoided doing.
Secondly, the microeconomic structures
have provided a shield against over-
investment and short-sighted speculation.
Ties between banks and firms were weaker
than in South Korea, so that there was no
similar spurt of risky lending. The propen-
sity to accumulate foreign debt was also
limited by the smaller importance and
power of company groups.
Taiwan’s development was based on
small and medium-sized firms, rather than
huge company groups. Whereas South Ko-
rea has capitalized on economies of scale in
a fairly low number of export products, the
economist C.Y. Ahn argues that Taiwan’s
SMEs have found markets for a wider range
of products in smaller quantities,48 which
makes them less vulnerable to changes in
world market prices. All in all, Taiwan was
better placed to face the challenge of finan-
cial globalization than South Korea was.
Interestingly, the slump that started in
the United States has had a bigger impact on
Taiwan than on South Korea. GDP growth
rate in 2001 slipped to a negative 2.2 per
cent, as against an average annual increase
of over 5 per cent in the 1998–2000 period.
The strongest negative factor was exports.
While both countries rely on IT demand in
the United States (and elsewhere), compa-
nies in Taiwan are more tied to US compa-
nies through original equipment manufac-
turing (OEM) contracts, so that they can be
more strongly affected by changes in the US
economy. Japan was also unable to boost
Taiwanese exports due to the sluggishness of
its economy. Over-capacity in manufactur-
ing was not wiped out as it was in South
Korea in 1998, so that, domestic capital in-
                                                
48 Ahn, C. Y. (2001), A search for robust East Asian
development models after the financial crisis: mutual
learning from East Asian experiences. Journal of
Asian Economics, No. 12, pp. 419–43.
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vestment fell in 2001 as well as 2002, when
real GDP growth returned to a positive 3.1
per cent.
Although the currency rate and the
stock market index fell more than in any
other country in the region during the 2001
recession, there was no talk of a financial
crisis, more of a trade-related slump. The
government’s policy reflected this in reduc-
ing interest rates 11 times – quite the oppo-
site of what South Korea did. However, do-
mestic non-performing loans made banks
reluctant to lend, which further depressed
investment. Policy-makers in Taiwan regard
FDI outflow as an increasingly dangerous
development, which contributes to the fall in
domestic investment and possibly employ-
ment too.
As for FDI inflows and international
finances, Taiwan did not face up to the
challenge of globalization to the extent that
South Korea did. There was no such pressure
for structural reforms from abroad, because
there was no financial crisis like the South
Korean one. Furthermore, Taiwan is still no
member of the OECD, which leaves it some
scope for maintaining capital controls. Un-
like South Korea, it has been relatively iso-
lated in terms of membership in interna-
tional organizations. This makes problems
for Taiwanese leaders, but also gives some
limited protection from increasingly global-
ized policies and rules. However, the influ-
ence of global financial institutions (along
with Taiwanese leaders’ aspirations to join
them) and the need to consolidate the weak-
ened banks and financial institutions have
persuaded the government to make financial
reforms since 2000. Although these are not
dramatic, their resemblance to those in
South Korea shows that the global and Far
Eastern trend of financial liberalization and
deregulation cause Taiwan to follow in the
same direction. Banks are allowed to enter
into new types of financial business and the
scope for securities firms has increased.
Mergers between financial institutions and
the formation of financial holding compa-
nies are also encouraged by new regulations.
Some state monopolies are affected by the
ongoing privatization.
Since the World Trade Organization is
a hallmark of globalization, probably, the
most recent challenge of globalization is
Taiwan’s membership of WTO since 2002.
Politically, this is a success for Taiwan, al-
lowing it to break out of its isolation, despite
the efforts of the People’s Republic of China.
De jure Taiwan joined the organization un-
der the names of several islands forming an
‘independent economic unit’, but de facto it
became a member at the same time as the
People’s Republic did.
The agricultural sector faces the big-
gest challenge from WTO membership.
Products like rice, corn, soybean and fruits,
as well as pork and poultry, will face strong
foreign competition, because tariff rates
have to be reduced and non-tariff barriers
removed. The Taiwanese authorities are al-
lowed to apply tariff quotas to 22 agricul-
tural products, including rice, but they have
to be abolished by 2006. The government is
calling for a restructuring in agriculture,
including a cut in production of less com-
petitive products, upgrading the efficiency
of farms, encouraging farmers to set aside
land or switch to other uses, and improving
sales distribution and promotion. These poli-
cies include encouraging small farmers to
move towards larger-scale production, for
instance by forming cooperatives. For in-
dustrial products, average nominal tariff
rates have to be reduced from 6.15 per cent
in 2002 to 4.31 per cent by 2006. For 286
industrial products, tariffs have to be re-
duced to zero. The most protected industry,
road-vehicle manufacturing, will face the
removal of trade restrictions (high import
tariffs). Tobacco, wine and beer production,
which are state monopolies, will be deregu-
lated. More competitive industrial goods,
such as electronics and textiles will benefit
from trade liberalization, while automobiles
and motor cycles will experience strong
competition from foreign makers. The
opening of the government procurement
market will be a challenge, for instance, for
the heavy electronic engineering industry.
The answer from the government to these
challenges includes WTO-consistent anti-
dumping and other safeguard measures,
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providing WTO-consistent financial incen-
tives to companies, such as tax breaks on R &
D, and promotion of e-commerce to revital-
ize the industrial sector. The services sector
will see the weakest impact of joining, as
they are mainly more liberalized than WTO
standards require.49 The most important
changes are liberalization of portfolio in-
vestment and the easier access by foreign
banks and securities firms to the Taiwanese
market.
Although both Taiwan and the People’s
Republic of China are members of the WTO,
bilateral restrictions have not been removed.
Since the two countries do not recognize
each other, there can be no dispute settle-
ment between them in the WTO. So the
WTO is not acting as a means of liberalizing
their bilateral trade relations, although Tai-
wan and the People’s Republic are seizing
negotiating opportunities within the WTO
framework. Regardless of this strange situa-
tion, Taiwan’s trade and investment relations
with mainland China are becoming stronger
and stronger. Liberalizing the restrictions is
done gradually on a bilateral basis.
Conclusions
There is no doubt that South Korea and Tai-
wan have faced the challenges of globaliza-
tion in recent years. Policy-makers generally
follow the trend of global liberalization and
deregulation, but seek responses that defend
their countries from the worst effects of
globalization. South Korea, less isolated as
Taiwan, aims to become a regional business
hub, profiting in various ways from the ac-
celerated international movement of capital
and services. Taiwan has to rely on sober
and effective domestic economic policies as
some measure of defence against global eco-
nomic uncertainties.
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3) GLOBALIZATION THROUGH




A huge country like China, opening its mar-
kets only gradually, feels the negative im-
pacts of globalization far less than the
smaller, more open economies considered in
the previous chapter. Having obtained WTO
membership in December 2001, the People’s
Republic of China has also begun the proc-
esses of liberalization that lead to globaliza-
tion. However, China puts maximum effort
into furthering its interests as a great power.
Its protectionist approach is therefore likely
to remain and China will become a winner
rather than a loser by globalization.
The process of globalization is kept
alive by free movement of the factors of pro-
duction. Capital liberalization and the dis-
mantling of trade barriers have been pro-
gressing fast, but the movement of the third
factor, labour, remains strongly constrained.
The will to retain restrictions on labour
movement appears mainly in the context of
migration among nation-states, although
there have been examples of hindrances to
internal migration as well. Human rights
and the positive concomitants of globaliza-
tion will remain curtailed until such barriers
to internal and external labour movements
are removed.
China is becoming increasingly ex-
posed to globalization and dependent on it,
but China itself is simultaneously helping to
cause and feeling the effect of the process.
Its responses to globalization can best be
seen through its policies on the problems
threatening sustainable development, such
as overpopulation, short food supplies, en-
vironmental damage, urbanization, social
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insensitivity, migration, nationalism and se-
curity.
Economic policies: goals and achievements
The accomplishments of the policy of ‘re-
form and opening’ prove that the aims and
methods formulated more than two decades
ago – in what the Chinese call a ‘socialist
market economy with Chinese characteris-
tics’ – were well founded. The ‘three-stage
development strategy’ was introduced by
Deng Xiaoping. The first stage lasted from
1981 to 1990, when Chinese GNP per capita
doubled to the equivalent of USD 500 and
basic food supplies for the country were se-
cured in a self-sufficient fashion. In the sec-
ond stage (1991–2000), the aim was to in-
crease GNP to the equivalent of USD 800–
1000 per capita. Figures drawn from a
survey conducted in 94 countries by the
World Bank indicated that China’s GNP was
USD 490 per capita in 1995, placing it 73rd
among the countries surveyed. The same
sum calculated at purchasing power parity
(PPP), however, was USD 2330, which
ranked China 63rd. By 2000, GNP had al-
most doubled to USD 840 per capita and it
reached USD 970 in 2002.50 The plans for
the third stage envisage per capita GNP
reaching USD 4000 in the next 30–50 years.
If this is attained, China will have changed
from a developing country into one at a me-
dium level of development, even according
to its self-definition.51
China, in pursuing its policy of open-
ing up to the outside world had to face the
fact that some degree of liberalization could
not be avoided and social and economic
changes would entail some loosening of
ideological control. Four priorities have been
formulated since the turn of the millennium,
emphasising the establishment of small and
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medium-size private firms, the transforma-
tion of the big state-owned enterprises
(SOEs), establishment of a new monetary
system, and development of the legislative
and judicial system required for a market
economy.
China’s macroeconomic achievements
have been truly remarkable. It has suc-
ceeded in consolidating its growth rate at a
high level while avoiding possible negative
effects through overheating. The budget
deficit at present amounts to 3 per cent of
GDP, and only 16 per cent of GDP is con-
trolled by central government. China has the
highest savings rate in the world, reaching
about 40 per cent of the GDP over the last
five years. Reserves were at USD 158 billion
in 200052 and grew to USD 286.4 billion by
the end of 2002, while net debt amounted to
USD 170 billion in mid-2002.53 In this year,
the sum of foreign investment in China sur-
passed the foreign investment in the United
States for the first time ever. Foreign inves-
tors have been investing an average of USD
40–45 billion a year in China in recent
years. At the peak, by the end of 2002, for-
eign investment reached USD 52.7 billion.
China today is the fourth biggest industrial
producer of the world, with an industrial
growth rate of around 12 per cent a year.
Apart from its traditional labour-intensive
goods, China exports more and more com-
plex products, whose quality is also im-
proving. Exports of Chinese hi-tech products
are increasing: in the first six months of
2002, 47 per cent of exported Chinese goods
were of this type (even if the concept of
definition is somewhat vague.) However,
labour productivity is still rather low, at 4
per cent and 5 per cent of that of an Ameri-
can or German colleague, respectively.
                                                
52 Statistical communiqué of the PRC on the 2002
National Economic and Social Development (2003).
Beijing: National Bureau of Development of China,
February 28, pp. 2–3.
53 Summary of the report on the implementation of
the 1999 Plan for National Economic and Social De-
velopment and on the draft 2000 plan (2000). China
Economic News No. 4, pp. 6–9.
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During the 1996–2000 period, aver-
age annual economic growth rate was 8.3
per cent. Measures of economic policy
started to have a positive effect on the eco-
nomic overheating in 1996. GDP growth,
which had regularly surpassed 9 per cent,
had consolidated by 2000 at around 8 per
cent and 8 per cent was the rate in 2002 as
well. After a short setback of 0.2–0.9 per-
centage points, the still exceptionally high
growth rate is expected to increase again, so
long as the outbreak of SARS and its negative
effects on the economy do not continue for a
critical length of time. China still seems to
have plenty of reserves, as the national
product in 2002 reached USD 1289 billion
(at current rates). Inflation peaked at 8.3 per
cent in 1996, after which came a spectacu-
lar decrease to not more than 1.4 per cent in
2000. Retail sales grew by 8.9 per cent,
while the consumer price index declined by
0.2 per cent in 2002. The effects of last
autumn’s governmental price rises in public
utilities, the rapid rise in real-estate prices,
and the stability of the price index all indi-
cate that there remain certain deflationary
factors in the economy.
Deflation in China is being accompa-
nied by rapid economic growth. The main
reason of the deflation is the swiftly ex-
panding supply of goods, coupled with ex-
cessive investment, in fact caused by ineffi-
cient distribution of resources. The inade-
quate structure of the outstanding loans
made by state-owned banks was one conse-
quence of the misuse and bad allocation of
resources during the great upsurge of in-
vestment in the 1990s. The great rise in pro-
duction capacity was caused by a number of
factors. The open-door policy had paved the
way for an influx of modern technologies
from abroad. Another contribution came
from the abundant supply of labour for in-
dustry. Labour reserves in agriculture pro-
vide an important condition for speedy in-
dustrialization, while also keeping wages
depressed. The over-capacity was partly
caused also by the upsurge in investment
that began early in the 1990s, in which de-
cisions were not always made according to
market principles. The state-run and coop-
erative companies, armed with cheap loans,
would tend to maximize volume of produc-
tion rather than profits. Deflation in China’s
case means that the growth rate of aggregate
demand lags behind that of production ca-
pacity. The long-lasting decrease in prices in
China has a number of causes:
* Technological innovation and increasing
productivity make production costs
lower, which leads to a fall in prices.
* Improving technology and management,
increasing investments, expanding com-
panies and growing production capacities
provide an abundant supply of goods.
* Insecurity among consumers caused by
structural reforms, joins with low agri-
cultural incomes to decrease consumer
demands.
The solution to the problems of defla-
tion would be to redirect some of the high
household savings to consumption and
narrow the gap between cities and country-
side. To realize this, however, the central
government would have to allocate much
greater resources to development of back-
ward regions.
The main sources of development in
the first twenty years of the reform process
were accumulation, investment and export-
oriented production. After 1998, supple-
mentary resources were sought. Consump-
tion on the internal market, increased ex-
ports and infrastructural investment became
important elements of economic strategy.
The policy of expanding the internal market
demand is based on an extraordinarily high
savings rate among the Chinese. However,
internal demand is still stagnating and
measures to revive demand have not
brought great success. No significant
changes can be expected without reforming
the system and the supply side. The volume
of deposits of the population grew by 14.7
per cent in 2001 and 16 per cent to August
2002, which indicates that the surplus in-
come of the population did not contribute to
the growth of consumption. The savings
reached USD 756 billion in March 2000
and 963 billion in August 2002, which
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amounts to almost three-quarters of the
country’s GDP.
Structural problems
The sectors of the Chinese economy are un-
dergoing rearrangement in accordance with
the development priorities. These changes in
the relative weights of agriculture, industry
and the services, are following the trends in
the world economy, although somewhat
lagging behind. Between 2001 and 2002,
the proportion of the first sector fell from
17.6 per cent to 14.5 per cent, while the
second rose from 49.1 per cent to 51.7 per
cent, and the third also increased, from 33.3
per cent to 33.7 per cent.54 The expansion of
services is still continuing.55
What the world admires in China is its
economic growth and the way it is coping
with structural problems. The macroeco-
nomic data indicate that the stability of the
system has allowed the country to preserve
its ‘socialist market economy with Chinese
characteristics’ – maintaining centralized
management and planning and combining it
with market mechanisms has been a spec-
tacular success. The bases for continued de-
velopment have been laid in the main sec-
tors of the economy. But in spite of these
great successes, the development is ill-
balanced and China is more vulnerable po-
litically and economically than its economic
accomplishments might suggest. For the
structural weaknesses in the economy turn
out to be worse than forecast. Unemploy-
ment will rise if the rate of growth falls be-
low 6 per cent. Moreover, no one had ex-
pected the rapid development of the econ-
omy would be threatened by an epidemic
such as the SARS outbreak in 2003 – that a
collapse of the Chinese medical system
would prove to be the Achilles’ heel, reveal-
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ing acute problems in Chinese society. For
90 per cent of the staff treating patients in
the Chinese medical infrastructure have no
university qualifications. In critical situa-
tions, therefore, administrative measures
work much better than medical treatment.
The reforms have incorporated into
the system a number of factors that directly
or indirectly threaten social stability. The
most important is the wide and persistent
dispersion of development levels within the
country, which will take a long period of
economic prosperity to resolve. The tensions
between the various strata and classes of so-
ciety and growing uncertainty of livelihood
are leading to mounting discontent. Rates of
unemployment and poverty are increasing.
The tensions caused by the transformation
process form the most unpredictable aspect
of China’s future.
The imbalances of the economy are
related closely to problems of social and
human resources. Deng Xiaoping’s reforms
undermined social achievements that had
secured a basic livelihood for everyone, al-
beit at a low level. The chance of getting rich
produced a process of polarization in Chi-
nese society, widening the gap between rich
and poor and engendering a middle class
not known before in the region. By 2005,
China will have 200 million middle-income
consumers. A recent study by the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences put the middle
class at 15 per cent of the working popula-
tion. Trade minister Long Yongtu calculated
that 400–500 million Chinese would enjoy
middle-income status by 2011. The middle
class would be a big winner from economic
growth.56
It is not easy to cope with the distress
of losing a lifelong job and the abolition of
the ‘iron rice bowl’ for a society that grew
up on the egalitarian principles of Mao
Zedong. The losers by the market economy
can hardly accept the growing economic
differentiation or the individualized version
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of ‘self-sufficiency’. Efforts to attain self-
sufficiency were constant elements in the
Mao era, and this dogma, in an altered form,
still constitutes a mobilizing force. This af-
fected agriculture on a political level in the
1980s and 1990s and contributed to the
abandonment of the individual in society.
Unemployment, an ineffective welfare net
and rising corruption are all factors that
amplify the sense of danger felt by the pub-
lic. Several phenomena characteristic of the
period before the People’s Republic are re-
viving:
* As the gap between rich and poor widens,
50.2 per cent of wealth is concentrated in
the hands of the richest quintile of the
population, while the poorest quintile
owns only 4.3 per cent. It was revealed in
1998 that 80.6 per cent of the population
were dissatisfied with the growing rich-
poor divide. Surveys suggest that the idea
of people getting wealthy legally was
widely ridiculed, and 87 per cent of soci-
ety expressed considerable concern about
the social situation.
* Unemployment and crime are increasing.
* There is a revival of clan-type organiza-
tions that threaten traditional voluntary
organizations and weaken control in the
countryside.
* The black economy is expanding as the
triads emerge.
* Infiltration of officialdom by the under-
world leaves the population increasingly
defenceless in smaller communities.
* There are higher risks of social disorder –
crime, disruptive religious and other
sects, etc. – as unemployment and migra-
tion spiral.
These and other factors increase the
tensions and problems within society. The
quality of life is also threatened by factors
such as environmental damage and deple-
tion of natural resources:
* Air pollution is ten times higher than in
American cities. Evaluation of the danger
and measures to reduce it are impossible
for lack of protective and measuring de-
vices.
* Desiccation and desertification are oc-
curring.
* Urbanization and soil erosion are de-
creasing the area under cultivation at a
rate of 0.5 per cent a year.
* Estimates put the cost of environmental
damage in China at 15 per cent of GDP.
* Natural disasters, such as flooding of the
Yangtze, occur frequently, cause general
environmental and social damage.
* These developments lead to secondary
dangers such as reduction in grain sup-
plies, increased internal migration,
mounting violence against city function-
aries and the wealthy, etc.57
Human resources
The hindrance to healthy development in
present-day China is not the political system.
The biggest destabilizing factor is the tension
caused by inevitable social transformation,
although the government has so far had suc-
cess in handling it. Nonetheless, it remains
questionable how long the relative equilib-
rium can be maintained. The least predict-
able aspect is the reaction of the ‘human
resources’, which can be grouped around
two factors: employment and social polari-
zation.
1) Employment in China in 2002 was 737.4
million.58 Rising unemployment is the prob-
lem most difficult for Chinese society to
handle. One of the main economic difficul-
ties is the huge volume of debt owed by
SOEs. Structural reform was initiated but
remains incomplete. The three-year deadline
for the transformation process announced in
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1997 was later extended for another three
years. It was designed to reduce the size and
number of loss-producing SOEs. As a conse-
quence, over 50,000 factories closed and
many surviving ones had to dismiss workers.
Only a quarter of the SOEs today operate in
industry. The rest are involved in services
such as wholesaling, transportation and fi-
nance. By 2000, the non-state sector had
come to account for 50.9 per cent of indus-
trial output. State ownership and control
over the economy continues to decline.
One of the toughest conditions for
WTO membership was the requirement of
abolishing central subsidies to SOEs. The ap-
pearance of foreign investors in China has
intensified competition, so that many Chi-
nese businesses can only compete if they re-
ceive state subsidies. Most have already been
placed under so-called corporate manage-
ment with the participation of external in-
vestors. According to Chinese plans, 33 per
cent of companies can be owned by foreign
investors for the time being, but in the first
three years of WTO membership, the pro-
portion is allowed to reach 49 per cent. The
conversion, however, proceeds very slowly.
Despite every effort, the central government
has not yet found the optimum way to con-
vert loss-producing enterprises into profit-
motivated companies with real owners. Par-
tial sales through the stock market have
turned out to be a failure.
The government intends to retain 100
per cent ownership only in a limited number
of SOEs of cardinal importance to the econ-
omy. A decision by the Chinese Communist
Party in September 1999 recommended re-
taining a government role in (1) sectors vital
for national security, (2) natural resources,
(3) industries essential to public consump-
tion and services, and (4) industries associ-
ated with high and other new technologies.
(Deciding which areas belong here is usu-
ally a result of political, rather than profes-
sional compromise, however.)
The reforms have cost millions of
workers their jobs and will do the same to
further millions in the future. No definite
unemployment rate can be given, because it
is unclear who qualifies as unemployed, but
independent analysts estimate it at around
15 per cent. Rationalization of the SOEs in-
volved 36 million workers between 1995
and 2001, i.e. 34 per cent of all employees.
In 2001, the rate of registered unem-
ployment in the cities reached 4.5 per cent,
as compared with 3.1 per cent in the previ-
ous year. At the end of 2002, Minister of La-
bour Zhang Zhang put the urban unem-
ployment rate at 3.6 per cent (7.25 million
people), alongside which there were 6 mil-
lion xiagang (laid-off workers). There are
also known to be people who do not actually
work, but receive some support from their
previous employer. The lack of job security
among employees of the SOEs reduces con-
sumer confidence and increases the savings
rate. According to official figures, about a
quarter of the SOE labour force – 26.11 mil-
lion workers – have been laid off in the last
four years. Forecasts of unemployment by
2006 are as high as 20 million, compared
with 6.8 million today. (A survey by the
Asian Development Bank mentions 37 mil-
lion urban poor, or 12 per cent of the urban
population.) So the urban unemployment
rate is estimated currently at 7–10 per cent,
but may grow to 15 per cent in the near fu-
ture. The number of those registered unem-
ployed and those living below the poverty
line who receive a minimum subsistence al-
lowance was 2.8 million in 1999 and 20
million in 2002. The reform of the welfare
system, aimed at curbing government subsi-
dies, attempts to shift some of the burdens
onto households. The high unemployment
and the insufficiencies of the welfare net in-
crease the sense of insecurity among the
population. The central government is aware
of the mounting social tensions. The influ-
ence of the communist party has been
strengthened, but the growing numbers of
demonstrations and strikes indicates that
dissatisfaction and tension are still rising.
There have been several large protests and
many smaller demonstrations recently, some
of them violent. These have been handled
cautiously by the security forces, with con-
cessions and few arrests, in an attempt to
reduce the risk of local events developing
23
into larger or nationwide protests. News
blackouts have been placed on many local
conflicts for the same reason. As authorities
usually seal protest sites immediately, little
becomes known about the nature of these
movements.59 The growing number of arbi-
tration proceedings at work places (23,000
cases in 1995, 120,000 in 1999 and almost
200,000 in 2002) also indicates that ten-
sions are increasing.60
The market reforms have sharpened
social conflicts between labour on the one
hand and enterprise management, local offi-
cials and the state on the other. A more res-
tive Chinese working class is emerging, as
shown by a massive eruption of collective
action over the last two decades or more.
Such labour conflict also takes new forms
due to the Chinese government’s efforts to
institutionalise conflict resolution.61
According to the World Bank, China
will need to create 100 million new jobs in
the ten years from 2001, to soak up unem-
ployment and absorb the school leavers and
migrant workers. The gravity of the situation
is shown by the fact that one of the major
subjects at the 16th Party Congress in No-
vember 2002 was strengthening of the pri-
vate sector, which it was hoped would lead
to job creation.
The number of those made redundant
who find new employment is decreasing. In
1998, 42 per cent were able to find new
work, but by the first half of 2001, the pro-
portion was down to 9 per cent. China can
create 8 million jobs a year if it achieves 7
per cent growth. This is far behind the de-
mand for 20 million new jobs a year for the
next four years, as a result of 150 million
surplus rural workers, 12–13 million an-
nual additions to the workforce, 6.8 million
unemployed at the end of 2001, and SOE
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lay-offs of some 5 million a year. The two
classes of losers by this are rural workers
and SOE employees.
2) The social polarization in China includes
a widening rural-urban gap in income and
standard of living, coupled with problems of
food supplies and self-sufficiency.
Today 70 per cent of the population
still lives in the countryside. By the 1990s,
the Chinese peasantry had ceased to be a
homogenous class. It is divided into a num-
ber of strata, from those cultivating land on
a contract basis and workers in collective
village enterprises to private entrepreneurs.
The widening price gap between agricul-
tural and industrial products and the rising
taxes help to increase the burden on the ag-
ricultural population. Insufficient land and
the great surplus of manpower mean that
peasants have always striven to diversify
their sources of income to make a living. The
need of security is also the reason why peas-
ants hold on to their land.
The inequalities between the urban
and rural areas affect the majority of the
population in a negative way, by limiting the
consumption of the rural population. In
2002, the per capita income of city-dwellers
(RMB 7.703, about USD 930) was more
than three times higher than that of the 700
million villagers (RMB 2.476, USD 299).62
Between 1996 and 2002, the average in-
come increased by 4.3 per cent a year in the
countryside and 7.6 per cent in the cities,
which meant the income gap was widening
further. Among the factors impeding the
rural population from catching up is the
underdeveloped infrastructure in the coun-
tryside. The number of migrant workers
from the countryside in Chinese cities is
constantly growing. The rural-urban divide
is one of the critical lines of friction in
China. Large-scale labour migration is one
of the most important developments during
the two decades of reform. By the mid-
1990s, 80–100 million people were work-
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ing or living far from their place of perma-
nent domicile. The division by rural-urban
residence is no longer clear-cut, but Chinese
society by and large can still be divided into
‘agricultural’ and ‘non-agricultural’ seg-
ments. Labour migrants from rural areas are
not uniform. Three main occupational
groups can be distinguished:
* The largest group in the major cities con-
sists of unskilled or semi-skilled young
male construction workers, organized in
teams along native-place lines.
* A major group consists of industrial
workers, not only in the large cities, but
in industrialized parts of the countryside.
Young migrant women predominate in
some industries, such as textiles and
electronics.
* Self-employed migrants working in small
enterprises and households include ped-
lars, traders operating market stalls or
counters in shops, garbage collectors,
domestic workers, subcontractors of agri-
cultural land on city outskirts, etc.63
Those from the countryside usually
find low-paid or seasonal work. The poverty
rate among them is 1.5 times higher than
among urban workers. Most migrants do not
respect the registration regulations (hukou)
that oblige them to apply for permits from
local authorities. This illegality of status
makes migrants vulnerable to low wages,
unlimited overtime work, inhuman treat-
ment and working conditions, and constant
fear of expulsion. The conditions of those
employed legally are not much better, as
they are burdened in smaller and larger cit-
ies by various levies and taxes. Males aged
18–40 make up 80 per cent of these work-
ers.
Employers prefer migrant workers to
local ones, as they require lower wages and
no social insurance or other benefits need be
paid. Nonetheless, migrant workers are still
better off than those who stay behind in the
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countryside, as they can get jobs and earn
much higher wages. They usually send most
of their income home and retain their land-
holdings there. However, from the agricul-
tural point of view, it is detrimental that this
money tends to be invested in house-
building rather than farming.
The number of unregistered workers
and underemployed peasants is estimated
even officially at 120–150 million. The rural
sector of this total is likely to be the largest.
Already, about 80 million of the 150 million
estimated surplus workers in the rural sector
are travelling elsewhere in the country
looking for work. Given that agricultural
prices in China are higher than world-
market prices, farmers’ incomes are likely to
fall, so that more rural people migrate to ur-
ban areas. Adding in the 150 million surplus
rural workers, the number of unemployed in
China can be put at 190–200 million – 29
per cent of those of active age.
According to Chinese statistics, the
number of city-dwellers living below the
poverty line was 20 million in 2002. This,
even by the Chinese definition, means that
this number of people is short of food and
clothing. The number living in absolute pov-
erty in the countryside is around 28 million,
while 60 million there have succeeded in
emerging from poverty, although they face a
constant threat of falling back into poverty
at any time.64 The greatest, though not the
only danger of social explosion is the in-
crease in unemployment. Intense commer-
cialization of land, labour and produce,
rapid urbanization, vast construction proj-
ects and public works, and rural industriali-
zation are accompanied by weak market
norms, a rudimentary legal and tax regime,
pliant environmental monitoring, and a po-
litical system that often ignores or sup-
presses social grievances, rather than re-
sponding to them. The situation is worsened
by environmental degradation, associated
economic and health costs, excessive and
sometimes illegal taxes imposed by local
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cadres, widespread official corruption, fail-
ures to fulfil contract obligations, and
widespread official confiscation of collective
rural land, for resale by governments and
developers at astronomical profits. This is in
spite of the system of leasing land to farmers,
who then have latitude to conduct profitable
farming with less intervention from local
party officials.
The economic weight of agriculture,
which was the main engine of development
at the beginning of the reforms, is steadily
decreasing. Its productivity is declining due
to exhaustion of its extensive reserves. There
has been no widespread turn to capital-
intensive farming for lack of capital. Grain
plays a major role in feeding the country,
but grain production has increased from
435 million t in 1991 to 457 million tons
ten years later, while the population has
risen by more than 160 million.65 China de-
pends increasingly on grain imports. WTO
membership also contributes to the vulner-
ability of Chinese agriculture. The produc-
tion costs of agriculture and food industry
are higher in China than the world market
prices, but WTO regulations demand that
subsidies cease. As a result of trade liberali-
zation, Chinese peasants will face global ag-
ricultural corporations defenceless and un-
prepared.
Serious problems occur at village level,
as the communist party has not shown itself
capable of addressing effectively local-level
corruption and abuse of power. A law on
rural land use was passed in August 2002 to
solve some of these problems, but it is too
early to estimate its effectiveness.
Observing the unrest in the villages,
the abuses that cause conflicts can be di-
vided into five categories:
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* Land-related cases: 40 per cent of com-
plaints lodged in 2002 related to land
disputes.66
* Unofficial taxation.
* Problems related to administration.
* Business-related problems.
* Abuse of power by cadres.67
The growing diversity of the social
classes brings increasing income inequality
that generates resentment. The Gini coeffi-
cient climbed from 0.389 to 0.397 over the
1995–9 period, according to the China In-
vestigation Report of May 2002. In rural ar-
eas in 15 provinces, the Gini coefficient is
between 0.3 and 0.4, whereas internal party
documents suggest that a Gini coefficient of
0.4 is the danger line for social resentment.
A recent internal party document revealed
that 59 per cent of workers and staff com-
plained that the status of workers had de-
clined in China.68
The precondition for social and eco-
nomic stability in China is success with the
present reform of SOEs and the welfare as-
pects of this. Structural transformation and
improvement of educational attainment and
training are expected to further the pro-
grammes for creating jobs. This is related to
the rapid urbanization, which is partly
spontaneous and partly controlled. It is
hoped that China will reach a 55 per cent
urbanization rate by 2020, which will re-
duce the proportion of the agricultural
population to 30–35 per cent.69 According
to the Xinhua news agency, 1.3 million ha of
cultivated land will fall victim to the urbani-
zation process in the next ten years, which
means that 12 million peasants will lose
their source of livelihood.70
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The majority of welfare programmes
still concentrated in 2002 on the backward
regions of the country. The aim is to narrow
the gaps, with the main priority is develop-
ment of the agriculture and infrastructure of
rural regions. The least developed is the
Western Region, whose backwardness is in-
dicated by the development target: the main
aim is to have asphalted roads linking every
county with the provincial capital, and to
have an electricity system, at least in the cit-
ies.
Chinese workforce remains one of the
cheapest in Asia. While internal migration
and rising unemployment generate serious
tension in society, China’s competitiveness is
greatly improved by the large quantity of
cheap, relatively well-trained labour, which
will remain available for a long time. This
gives China a big comparative advantage on
the world market. Thanks to the labour
force, it will be possible to maintain the ex-
port-oriented strategy that has been contrib-
uting to the success of the reforms.




The events in the world economy in the last
few years have been somewhat disturbing.
South-East Asia was hit by a monetary crisis
in 1997–8 that sent shock waves as far as
other continents. It became clear that the
international monetary system had many
weaknesses and trust in the omnipotence of
the market was eroded. The new millennium
brought a recession in the United States,
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ending the longest known period of peace-
time prosperity. The initial momentum of
the IT revolution diminished, investments
shrank, and NASDAQ fell by nearly 70 per
cent. Although the ‘new economy’ did not
disappear (in fact its returns seem quite sig-
nificant), companies reacted to the recession
with other strategies than investing in new
equipment. The economic problems were
worsened by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and
although direct effects were not economi-
cally significant, the psychological influ-
ences remain to this day. Many had been
waiting for a change in the leading position
in the world economy, expecting a deceler-
ating American ‘locomotive’ to be overtaken
by a European one. This did not happen, and
the stagnant Japanese economy failed to gain
momentum either.
On the other hand, some other regions
have performed well in recent years  despite
the unfavourable overall circumstances,
among them Hungary (with some other
Central and Eastern European countries) and
the world’s two most populous countries:
China and India. The economies of both the
last two countries are relatively closed, so
that they were able to defend themselves ef-
fectively from the shocks of 1998 and the
subsequent worldwide recession. This
chapter sets out to show how India has re-
sponded to the challenges of globalization
and changes in the world economy, how
these changes have shaped its performance,
and how the sudden breakdown of the IT
revolution influenced the two most dynamic
sectors: computer services and software in-
dustry.
The performance of the economy
Changes in India have usually taken place
very slowly, over decades or even centuries.
The traditional sector plays a major role in
the economy even today, and the so-called
unorganized sector provides 60 per cent of
national income.71 Household industry and
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agriculture (together more than a quarter of
GDP) are still integral parts of the traditional
Indian lifestyle, and changes in the villages
are almost imperceptible. It is very difficult
to measure employment or unemployment,
because so much of the labour force works
in the unorganized sector. A survey in
2002/3 shows that the active labour force
contained 363 million people, of whom 26
million were unemployed, i.e. the unem-
ployment rate exceeded 7 per cent, as op-
posed to a 1993 figure of 6 per cent. (Fig-
ures in the mid 1980s were higher, at
around 8 per cent.) Meanwhile 57 per cent
of the employed work in agriculture, 25 per
cent in the services, and only 18 per cent in
industry. The number of state and central
government employees in 2000 was 19 mil-
lion.72
The struggle against hunger in recent
decades has been quite successful. The rate
of chronically hungry in the country fell
from 12 to 6 per thousand, and in the cities
from 7 to 2 per thousand. The figures for
seasonal hunger show similar patterns, fal-
ling from 26 to 19 per thousand in the
country and from 6 to 4 per thousand in the
cities. Several government programmes have
been launched to fight poverty, including
the Water Supply Programme and the Rural
Infrastructure Development Fund.73 For
centuries, poverty in India has been seen
side by side with unlimited wealth in the
hands of the elite in power. The situation
changed a little after independence, when
the fabulous treasures of the maharajahs
came into the hands of the government. At
the same time, prosperity was spreading and
more and more families were reaching a
solid middle-class level. Today there are
more than 200 million Indians living in
European-style prosperity.
The reform process that began in 1991
brought a gradual liberalization of the ex-
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ternal sector. Foreign capital slowly began to
flow in and foreign trade revived. The liber-
alization opened up new possibilities in fi-
nance and consumption for middle-class
households. Following the British traditions
of training the elite, higher education re-
mains an important source of replacement
for higher officials, but the tens of thousands
of technical graduates each year make India
increasingly successful in the global econ-
omy. In addition, many students study
abroad, in prestigious British or American
universities. Some return home after
graduation, but the majority stay abroad in a
wide range of well-paid jobs. Indian engi-
neers, mathematicians, physicists and IT ex-
perts can be found in the forefront all over
the world, so that they form an important
reservoir of human resources. The two sec-
tors taking most advantage of this and re-
sponding best to the accelerating processes
of globalization in recent decades have been
computers and software services, which are
the fastest growing industries in the country.
The Indian economy in the first half of
the 1990s was growing at about 7 per cent a
year, which gave rise to enthusiastic fore-
casts of poverty being defeated and mod-
ernization promoted. Other observers
thought that the rate of change would be
temporary and the speed of transformation
(the spread of the market economy) would
fall back, especially if setbacks in the United
States reduced worldwide growth prospects.
India’s growth rate duly declined to 5–6 per
cent a year in the second half of the 1990s,
when effects of the South-East Asian finan-
cial crisis could be seen in its macroeco-
nomic aggregates, although India was less
affected than other countries in the region.
Since then, the situation has stabilized, real
growth was 6.1 per cent in fiscal
1999/2000, 4.4 per cent in 2000/2001,
and 5.6 per cent in 2001/2, the first year of
worldwide recession. According to the latest
survey, in 2002/3 real growth rate will be
4.4 per cent. At the beginning of the 1990s,
inflation was relatively high and threatening
to disrupt the whole economy. Hectic
changes in agricultural prices took the an-
nual inflation rate up to 14 per cent in one
28
year. By the end of the decade, inflationary
pressures had been relieved. Since then,
neither the producer nor the consumer price
index has risen by more than 5 per cent a
year – they were 4.4 and 3.2 per cent re-
spectively in 2002/3. Interest rates, on the
other hand, are still high. The central-bank
discount rate is 6.25 per cent, which is sig-
nificantly higher than in the advanced
economies. Low inflation and high interest
rates mean high real rates of interest, so that
the exchange rate of the rupee has been
strengthening and now stands at a firm 46–
48 to the USD. Private savings are still high.
Households save 22 per cent of their income,
more than half in financial deposits. Spend-
ing habits differ from Western patterns,
more than half the income going on basic
needs: food, beverages and tobacco.74
Favourable prospects and relatively
high interest rates have created an attractive
environment for foreign capital. Although
inflows were reduced after the events of
1998, they returned to the pre-crisis level of
USD 10 billion a year by 2000 and have re-
mained in that region since. The latest figure
is USD 10.4 billion dollars in fiscal 2001/2,
of which FDI accounted for almost USD 4
billion and portfolio investments for USD 2
billion. The relative weights of these two
have been changing, as portfolio investment
still exceeded FDI at the beginning of the
decade. There had been no significant FDI
inflows at all at the start of the liberalization
process (just USD 129 million in 1991/2),
while portfolio investments exceeded USD 4
billion. Since then, the trend has reversed,
with FDI inflows surpassing those of portfo-
lio investment by 2002. But the international
capital account shows another interesting
feature: the importance of international in-
ward transfers. Although the capital inflows
are still not considerable in absolute terms or
compared with the size of India, the results
are quite impressive for a period of slightly
more than ten years. To make a regional
comparison, the most attractive East and
South-East Asian country for investors in
                                                
74 Economic Survey 2002-03.
2001, after Japan, was China (USD 46.8 bil-
lion). Both Singapore and Thailand per-
formed better than India in absolute terms
(USD 8.6 and 3.8 billion respectively), but
India was ahead of Indonesia and Korea.75
The government has no doubts about
the benefits of the capital inflows and takes
every opportunity to maintain and promote
the process. The Vajpayee government has
liberalized further, allowing among other
things 100 per cent foreign ownership in
the infrastructure and majority ownership in
the banking sector, while taking the first
steps to liberalize the tea sector. It has intro-
duced important incentives for foreign com-
panies applying new technologies, intended
as a spur to technology transfer, by improv-
ing royalty and license-fee conditions sig-
nificantly. These measures at the same time
reduce budget revenue, which hinders re-
duction of the country’s mounting deficit. It
is commonplace, that the promised fiscal
rigour was only an election slogan by the
moderately nationalist, centre-right coalition
to maximize votes. From their point of view,
however, the roots of the huge budget deficit
can be traced to the liabilities of the previous
cabinet. These long-term burdens do not al-
low any significant cut in expenditure. In-
terest payments, defence expenditures and
government subsidies between them amount
to more than 60 per cent of the overall
spending. The Indian army, with a strength
of over a million, is one of the biggest in the
world. India has also developed a nuclear
capability, which brings serious dangers into
any further conflict with its likewise nuclear
neighbour Pakistan. Though tensions in the
last year have seemingly reduced, the de-
fence budget has been growing steadily. In
2001, it totalled USD 12 billion, which was
3 per cent of GDP.76
While capital inflows were growing,
the country had its first current-account
surplus for 23 years, with revenues exceed-
                                                





ing expenditures by USD 1.4 billion at the
end of fiscal 2002. Post-war India had
committed itself to an autarkic policy of im-
port substitution, but reforms in 1991 put
the economy on a new development path
towards market capitalism. Trade was par-
tially liberalized and demand from the bur-
geoning middle class brought a surge of im-
ports. The negative trade balance of USD 10
billion in 1991 widened throughout the
decade, reaching USD 17 billion in 2000
and still at USD 13 billion in 2002. The
trend had been accompanied by a rapid in-
crease in trade volume, so that exports by
then were two-and-a-half times greater and
imports double what they had been at the
beginning of the decade. In 2001, a year of
worldwide recession, exports stagnated and
imports fell by a billion dollars, bringing the
current account into surplus by year-end,
thanks to a strong, USD 14 billion surplus in
services and other invisibles. This remark-
able achievement in a country whose GDP is
less than USD 500 billion was helped by a
stable annual inflow of USD 12 billion in
transfers from several million Indians
working abroad, especially in the rich oil
states of the Middle East. In addition, there
was a USD 3.8 billion surplus in other serv-
ices in 2001/2 (USD 14.7 billion in income
and USD 10 billion in expenditure),77 in-
cluding computer and software services,
with an export income of USD 10 billion. Let
us examine the situation in more detail.
India’s most important exports for
centuries have been textile and leather
products. Garments, shoes, and leather ac-
counted in 2002 for 22 per cent of the
country’s exports of USD 45 billion. Also
significant was the share of almost 17 per
cent for jewellery, precious stones and dia-
monds. Other prominent exports are ma-
chinery and chemicals (almost 30 per cent
between them). Imports are much more di-
versified. USD 15 billion out of the USD 58
billion go on petroleum and oil products.
Other important items are diamond, gold,
and silver raw materials for the jewellery-
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making industry (USD 10.4 billion), capital
goods (USD 6.4 billion), electronic goods
(USD 4.3 billion), and chemicals (USD 3
billion dollars). The dependency on oil im-
ports leaves the Indian trade balance heavily
exposed to developments in the Middle East.
The main trading partners are the United
States, the EU countries (headed by the UK)
and Japan, followed by the oil-exporting
countries (in imports and money transfers).
However, the export performance is only
modest compared with such nations as
China (USD 267 billion), Korea (USD 150
billion), Singapore (USD 122 billion) or
Malaysia (USD 88 billion), so that growth
prospects remain good, especially as exports
in 1990/91 still amounted to only USD 18
billion.78 The economic indicators show that
neither the South-East Asian financial crisis
nor the world recession have had a deep im-
pact on the external economy. Apart from a
small drop in the aggregate figures, both
foreign trade and capital inflows have re-
mained stable, due to the still relatively
closed Indian economy and some special
features of its trade. The most interesting as-
pect is the services exports, especially the
performance of the computer and software
services industries.
The Indian response to globalization
The overall level of industrial development
and the absence of a strong-handed central
government in India did not allow it to fol-
low the Korean or Taiwanese development
path of concentrating on high-technology
manufacturing. However, it enjoyed some
other advantages found nowhere else in Asia
except Japan. The most important was a
highly skilled, low-cost, English-speaking
segment of the labour force, whose technical
and scientific education had qualified them
to tackle technical or computer tasks arising
anywhere in the world. This has allowed In-
dia to contribute to the international division
of labour most obviously in computer tech-
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nology, not in hardware, like Korea or Tai-
wan, but in software. The background nec-
essary called for relatively little capital in-
vestment, while the spread of the internet
spread instant, on-line global communica-
tions. Time zones also assisted: Indians could
do their tasks while Americans slept, so that
customers woke to find their problems
solved. The good knowledge of English
among polyglot India’s intellectuals is also
unusual in Asia. These two features provided
formidable comparative and competitive ad-
vantages in industries like computer and
software services, where rapid and precise
communication is essential.
Services exports are usually provided
in the supplier country, to which customers
physically travel. If a Hungarian travels to
the United States, for instance, and stays at a
hotel, the United States makes a service ex-
port. With software and other computer
services, nobody goes anywhere. Only in-
formation flows from one place to the other.
Rapid and economic transmission of infor-
mation ceases to be a problem in a globaliz-
ing world. Indian companies that grasped
this and began to offer on-line services soon
evolved into the country’s fastest-growing
industry. Exports of computer and software
services in 2002/3 amounted to USD 10
billion, and the industry has been growing at
an average rate of more than 30 per cent a
year. This might be predictable in times of
prosperity, but hardly in the wake of a sharp
decline in the IT industries. US investment in
information and communication devices has
declined steadily since 2001, as has invest-
ment as a whole. The recession has extended
to India’s other trading partners in the in-
ternational production chain, notably the
most prominent hardware manufacturers,
operating in the Far East and South-East
Asia. Yet in India, there have been no serious
signs of recession in the leading IT indus-
tries. Indeed, the country’s international po-
sitions even improved.
Of the USD 10 billion in computer and
software services sold abroad in fiscal
2002/3, software exports amounted to USD
7.6 billion, which was USD 1.7 billion up on
the previous year.79 The main reason, para-
doxically, was the slowdown in the world
economy. Companies are less likely to invest
in times of recession and more likely to seek
areas for cost cutting, through cheaper
sources and partners without any reduction
in quality. It is neither cheap nor easy to op-
erate and maintain the accumulated hard-
ware and infrastructure, which are obvious
targets for efficiency-led cost cutting. Indian
companies met these requirements. How-
ever, the extent of their success and the
contribution of the recession to their com-
petitive advantage need further explanation.
The first factor is connected with the steady
pace of reform in India. On the second, it
can be said that prosperity would probably
have come to the industry in any case, but
the events in the world economy gave them
a significant boost. India now accounts for 2
per cent of the world industry and the num-
ber of participants is relatively high. MNCs
account for almost 50 per cent in the serv-
ices as a whole, but only 22 per cent in the
software market. This low share can be very
important if there is a sudden change in the
software-location strategy of multinationals.
The foreign customers of Indian software
companies are mainly American (63 per
cent). Twenty-six per cent come from the EU
and 4 per cent from Japan.80 Nonetheless,
the spread of IT in households is still very
slow. In 2001, the number of internet sub-
scribers stood at 1.1 million, in 2002 at 1.7
million, and in 2003 at an estimated 2.1–2.8
million, which was still less than 0.3 per
cent of the population.
India’s performance in IT-enabled
services is also remarkable, with a turnover
of USD 2.4 billion last year in so-called
back-office activities such as customer serv-
ices, accounting, telemarketing, database
operations, and tax and human-resource
records. The biggest MNCs are gradually
enlarging their activities in India. GE Capital
employs 13,000, Citicorp 3000 and AmEx




2000 there.81 The liberalization process in
the telecom sector has slowly started as well,
with USD 6.7 billion invested so far, USD 2
billion of it from abroad. Also important is
venture capital financing. Constant innova-
tion in rapidly evolving industries like soft-
ware services is very expensive. Previously,
innovative entrepreneurs were backed by
private funds and bank loans, but these days,
the venture-capital industry has been insti-
tutionalized in the developed countries and
this has been spreading to India in the last
few years. Venture-capital obligations in
2002/3 exceeded USD 1.2 billion.
Conclusions
The performance of the Indian economy in
the past few years has been remarkable, es-
pecially in a highly unfavourable interna-
tional environment. Despite the recession,
internal and external processes have bene-
fited: rapid growth, relatively low inflation,
current account surplus, increasing capital
inflows, healthy currency reserves, and a
strong rupee. Neither the South-East Asian
financial crisis nor the US recession could
halt the Indian economy. On the contrary,
the worldwide slowdown encouraged com-
panies to turn to India as a way of cutting
costs. The drop in hardware investment has
not been reflected in software and IT serv-
ices, which has opened up further chances
for India. It should not be forgotten, how-
ever, that India remains a very poor country,
with problems, for instance, with clean wa-
ter and food supplies, over-population and
lack of public hygiene. There is an extensive
and ineffective bureaucracy, while govern-
ments are infested with corruption and dis-
tribute pointless subsidies that blunt India’s
efforts to reduce poverty. In the light of this,
the continued rapid growth of the software
sector predicted by observers could be a
huge advance, but it cannot fuel a transfor-
mation great enough to rescue the whole
country in the near future.
                                                
81 The Economist, February 22, 2003.




Globalization, a term that reached econom-
ics in the late 1980s, denotes increased inte-
gration of world production through new
technologies and the agency of transnational
corporations. Debates run on whether the
process is new or only a logical and inevita-
ble perfection of capitalism. On the other
hand, many new problems have emerged
around the world in the last decade of glob-
alization, even in developed countries. This
has led to mounting resistance and protests
in society, in the ‘North’ or ‘West’ and in the
‘South’ and to a lesser extent the ‘East’. The
resistance takes the form of ‘anti-
globalization’ movements or movements
‘critical of globalization’. (The difference
concerns whether the whole process is seen
as wrong, including worldwide socio-
economic and cultural integration and the
increased chances for information flows and
obtaining information, or whether only the
form it takes is rejected. The mainstream re-
sistance movement – devoid of extreme
right-wing, nationalistic ideologies and
demagoguery – is not against new technolo-
gies and the information flow, and so the
two expressions will be treated here as syn-
onymous.
Anti-globalization movements in the
developed and developing worlds differ in
their radicalism. There is a discernible dif-
ference of ‘centre of gravity’ between the
two main groups of countries in this respect.
Movements in the developing world often
deny that globalization is novel or even re-
frain from using the term, preferring to talk
of capitalism or a new stage in the develop-
ment of capitalism. Despite the differences,
however, movements, civil organizations,
NGOs and even parties critical of globaliza-
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tion are tending to integrate, which helps to
decrease these differences and give rise to a
rich worldwide movement that is more ho-
mogenous in its diagnoses and remedies.
Criticism of capitalism in Eastern
Europe became deeply unfashionable after
the collapse of state socialism, especially
among mainstream economists, who were
dominated by the ideology of neo-liberalism.
This, on the other hand, has been the main
target of the anti-globalization movements,
so that information about how other, distant
people see their problems and the world or-
der can be very illuminating.
The topic of anti-globalization is wide
and varied. This chapter considers only parts
of it, first in a thematic context and then
through some examples of the coordination
process among them.
Criticism of neo-liberalism
As in movements all over the world, criti-
cism of globalization in Asia tends to centre
on the problem of free trade: the interna-
tional rules of the WTO/GATS framework.
Abdul Hamid, for instance, argues that
due to tariff and tax-free imports by the de-
veloped countries, the majority of the infor-
mal, local industries, which have to pay VAT
and other taxes, have been destroyed. The
conditions of the WTO do not favour the
Asian countries, as these – for instance in the
garment industry – are more difficult to
overcome than the pre-WTO quota system.
The rules of intellectual property rights en-
danger many fundamental rights of the peo-
ple, the free flow of (mostly speculative) for-
eign capital has marginalized the local
capital, local entrepreneurs have become
indebted and bankrupt, the state owned
banks are suffering from liquidity crises,
etc.82
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These are the problems in which left-
wing Asian intellectuals and social leaders
tend to eschew the word ‘globalization’ and
underline the effects of multinational capital
by referring to ‘imperialist multinational
capital’.
Against speculative capital: ATTAC in Asia
Although there are no strong anti-
globalization activities in Japan, it is the one
country in the region to have its own ATTAC
organization. The Association for Taxation of
Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens
is a movement initiated by the intelligentsia
of the developed world (Le Monde Diploma-
tique) that proposes to regulate speculative
capital. Since its launch in December 1998,
ATTAC has spread to more than 30 countries
and 80,000 members and deepened its criti-
cism. However, its official line and activity
still place it among the less radical anti-
globalization movements, which is reflected
in the many criticisms it receives from other
social movements, mainly in the South.
Whatever opinion is held of ATTAC, it
is certainly one of the most active and suc-
cessful civil organizations in the field. It was
the initiator and remains one of the main
organizers of the World Social Forum and of
campaigns against neo-liberal globalization.
The relatively moderate social criticism and
the activism targeted at specific and imme-
diate tasks makes ATTAC successful in de-
veloped countries, among them Japan.
ATTAC Japan was founded in Decem-
ber 2001 and has some 500 members in 5
local chapters (in Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Sen-
dai and Fukushima). It campaigns against
neo-liberal globalization (against privatiza-
tion and the WTO/GATS), and for introduc-
tion of a Tobin tax, etc. The tone that ATTAC
Japan strikes is somewhat different from that
of the leaders of the ILPS (which will be de-
scribed later) and can be illustrated by
words of its secretary-general on the GATS
negotiations:
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‘What GATS aims at is, in fact, to de-
fine rules for liberalization of all service in-
dustries. It calls for a step-by-step abolition
of national barriers that block free trade in
the field of service. GATS targets all service
sections, but we are especially concerned
that public services directly involved with
our daily lives such as medicine, education,
energy and water are planned to be liberal-
ized/privatized… GATS brings by far the
biggest profit to multinational enterprises
dealing with service, as service industries
are the fastest growing area in world econ-
omy. The marketization and privatization of
public services in developed countries will
bring them enormous new opportunities for
business… Let us protest against WTO’s Un-
official Ministerial Conference this February
in Tokyo, and girdle this meeting with the
people’s solidarity power!’83
Concern for the environment
One of the oldest aspects of the worldwide
criticism of globalization is environmental,
and this applies in Asia as well. For example,
the Indian Centre for Science and Environ-
ment (CSE) established in 1980 is an ‘inde-
pendent, public interest organization, which
aims to increase public awareness on sci-
ence, technology, environment and devel-
opment.’84 The centre seeks solutions to the
deterioration of the environment that people
locally can implement and by which they
can be inspired to action. The CSE organizes
campaigns for clean air, water management,
clean rivers, etc.85
Another Indian environmental organi-
zation is Navdanya, which aims to facilitate
seed conservation and seed exchange of tra-
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ditional varieties, as an effort at ‘conserva-
tion of biodiversity, which is the basis of
cultural and material sustenance of our peo-
ple.’ These goals are now threatened by the
international trade regime, as intellectual
property rights formulated by the
WTO/TRIP (Navdanya calls them ‘the new
colonizers’) undermine farmers’ rights to
their innovations and establish monopolies.
Thus the protection of bio-diversity comes
into the orbit of the anti-globalization
movements. Navdanya promotes products
based on bio-diversity by managing pro-
grammes (Navdanya Foods), organizing fes-
tivals and campaigns, preparing booklets,
etc.86
Land ownership and peasant movements
Asia being a continent with huge agrarian
states, peasant movements also have their
bases there. Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipi-
nas and other organizations such as Via
Campesina joined the call of the peasant
movements to take agriculture out of the
WTO. Peasant protests are a familiar aspect
of anti-globalization movements in the de-
veloping world, notably in Brazil, where
more than 250,000 peasant families have
occupied 15 million acres of idle land.
Similar events have occurred in Honduras
and Ecuador, and struggles over land have
also rocked African countries. Asian peas-
ants are becoming more and more active.
India, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philip-
pines are amongst the countries where
militant peasant campaigns are attaining
partial successes.
The momentum behind these move-
ments is the fact that millions of people are
hungry despite sufficient resources. Ac-
cording to FAO data, almost all the more
than 800 million hungry people live in
countries that are actually producing food
surpluses. The peasant movements of Asia
blame this situation on the developed coun-
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tries. Their policies and those of transnation-
als lead to underdeveloped agriculture, a
biased agricultural structure (serving devel-
oped countries rather than local people), de-
pendence on agricultural exports (mainly
non-manufactured produce), shortage of
food, concentration of land ownership, mar-
ginalization of small farmers, and increases
in landlessness, unemployment and pov-
erty.87
This strategy, which they argue has
been founded on liberalization and increas-
ing monopoly control since the 1980s, in-
creases landlessness. In Asia and elsewhere
in the whole developing world, welfare nets
or alternative jobs for peasants are virtually
non-existent. As Santi Gangadharan, a pesti-
cide activist from Tamil Nadu told on the
‘People’s Caravan – Land and Food without
Poison’, an international protest caravan for
land reform in 2000, ‘In our country most of
the farmers have been forced to grow cash
crops instead of food crops due to the proc-
ess of globalization and liberalization and
because the government wants more export
earnings. Now there is no paddy. The fields
have been converted into flower gardens for
exports. Due to the globalization many peo-
ple in the villages have been forced to leave.
They have left their traditional homes, en-
tered urban areas and many of them are
without even food.’88
Anti-globalization and environment
protection combine in the peasant move-
ments. Resistance is also growing against
genetically altered seeds. On the same ‘Peo-
ple’s Caravan’, Jaharana Begum, a woman
farmer from Bangladesh and movement
leader, said, ‘We have so many varieties of
rice seeds, but instead we are going for the
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varieties from IRRI89 and the seed compa-
nies. These seeds need a chemical package.
So we are doing deals with scientists and
transnational companies. Transnational
companies, they come, they go. They don’t
care about our health or our environment.
No more, we’ve had enough! For our sur-
vival we have to commit ourselves to land
and food without poisons!’
For the majority of the developing
world, the most urgent question is land re-
form, on which militant farmers’ movements
are increasingly coordinating their struggles
at an international level. In 1996, peasant
organizations from the Philippines, Bangla-
desh and Brazil convened the Anti-
Imperialist World Peasant Summit in the
Philippines, where 49 peasant movements
and organizations from all over the world
participated. The peasants were also present
at the big Seattle demonstration in 1999 and
have taken part in protest marches against
international institutions like the IMF, World
Bank and WTO.
Concern for children and gender emancipation
Peasant movements in countries suffering
from food and land problems are closely
identified with the concerns of women.90 In
India, women’s organizations are particu-
larly strong. Women’s activism is not and
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cannot be restricted to gender and family
problems, as they are deeply rooted in the
general socio-economic conditions. So
women more and more frequently play a
leading or dynamizing role in the anti-
globalization movement.
Among the most aggressive women’s
movements is the Working Women Organi-
zation (WWO), which has appeared in vari-
ous parts of Asia and beyond. It has been
very active in protesting against the Ameri-
can invasion of Iraq, with strong peace
propaganda, meetings and demonstrations,
and joining in such events organized by oth-
ers. It cooperates closely with the All-
Pakistan Trade Union Federation (APTUF).
Among its other events, it organized joint
May Day marches in big industrial cities all
over Pakistan (Karachi, Multan, Faisalabad,
Sheikhupura, Quetta, Peshawar, etc.). Ac-
cording to its electronic newsletter, ‘Aima
Mahmood, Secretary of WWO, said that to-
day all over the world work-
ers/children/women workers are agitating
against colonialism, now it is our moral duty
to organize women/men/children to fight
against imperialist policies. She demanded to
end violence against women and paving way
for more opportunities for them in all walks
of life, she also put stress on that today
workers especially women workers are fac-
ing fascism, aggression and sexual harass-
ment. She appealed to workers and trade
union representatives to bring their families
out of houses to protest jointly against pov-
erty, unemployment and injustice.’
One of the best-known women in the
Indian anti-globalization struggle is Arund-
hati Roy, author of the novel The God of
Small Things and many other writings, in
which she has criticized and expressed op-
position to transnational corporations and
the US government-led globalization. She
stresses, however, that she is not against na-
tions (the American people), but against the
policies, politicians and classes behind
them.91
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Focusing on the global South
The organization Focus on the Global South
started in 1995, its aim being to ‘articulate,
link and develop greater coherence between
local community-based and national, re-
gional and global paradigms of change.’
While it addresses issues affecting the whole
South, its main work is done in the Asia-
Pacific region, where it is based in Bangkok.
It strives to cooperate with others working
on the issues of South, sharing experiences,
exchanging ideas and articulating alterna-
tives to neo-liberal globalization.92 All this
does not mean that it is merely a kind of
‘think tank’. It tries to organize or at least
support campaigns in its competence, but its
main activity is the collection of thoughts
(articles, studies, etc.). Walden Bello, execu-
tive director of Focus on the Global South
and professor of sociology at the University
of the Philippines, has written several arti-
cles on behalf of the anti-globalization
movement and acted as a Southern spokes-
person of the movement at several confer-
ences and demonstrations.
Coordination among movements
As the civil movements generally have lim-
ited opportunities of getting close to the
‘broad masses’, the endeavour to know each
other and make themselves known is strong.
Several umbrella organizations have been
formed and there have been efforts to create
‘movements of movements’. (A typical one is
the World Social Forum.) There is also a
growing number of websites that collect and
publish information, research materials, or-
ganizations, action plans, etc.
An example is the online civil-society
network known as OneWorld, which has
eleven centres around the world, one being
in New Delhi. OneWorld sets out to inform a




global audience about human rights and
sustainable development, by bringing to-
gether a global community working group,
through interactive online partnership of
organizations and individuals with a shared
vision.93
Similar to OneWorld is the Third
World Network, with a secretariat in
Penang, Malaysia, and has offices in Delhi
and elsewhere in Asia, North America and
Europe. It is likewise a network of organiza-
tions and individuals involved in issues re-
lated to development, the Third World and
North-South issues. It publishes daily, fort-
nightly and monthly newspapers (Third
World Economics, Third World Resurgence),
books on environmental and social issues,
organization of seminars, workshops, and
participation in international processes such
as the World Bank NGO Committee.94
Another initiative is the South Asian
Labour Forum, set up in Kathmandu in May
1996. There, and at a meeting at the end of
the same year, the labour organizations
(trade unions, NGOs and civil organizations)
of South Asia expressed their dissatisfaction
with the process of globalization, specifically
the WTO, the MAI (Multilateral Agreement
on Investments) that was then being formu-
lated, and the transnational corporations.
The participating members, mainly from In-
dia, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Pakistan, have
been encouraging closer economic coopera-
tion between South Asian countries, based
on a fair trade system, as an alternative to
intensifying international competition.95
The International League of Peoples’ Struggle
(ILPS)
The People’s Conference Against Imperialist
Globalization held in Manila in 1996 and
the anti-globalization movement People’s




Caravan Against APEC initiated a people’s
resistance process, out of which arose the
International League of Peoples’ Struggle
(ILPS).
The Network Opposed to APEC held a
conference in Vancouver in 1997 and the
Asia Pacific People’s Assembly organized an-
other in Kuala Lumpur in 1998, on the sub-
ject of ‘Confronting Globalization: Reassert-
ing People’s Rights’, keeping alive the proc-
ess of resistance and charting the course for
the ILPS.
The ILPS was launched by Professor
Jose Maria Sison of the Philippine National
Democratic Front, in a speech in Seattle in
November 1999. ILPS held its founding
conference in late 2000/early 2001 in
Europe. In May 2001,96 at the first interna-
tional assembly of the ILPS, 222 organiza-
tions participated from 40 countries, more
than half of them from Asia. The Philippine
NGOs were represented in the greatest
numbers, but large numbers of organiza-
tions also came from Nepal, Bangladesh and
India, and a few from Thailand, Indonesia,
Hong Kong, South Korea, Pakistan and Ma-
laysia. Organizations from European,
American and African countries were also
present, but none came from Japan.97 It is
interesting that the delegates of developing
and developed countries were almost equally
represented (19 and 16 persons respec-
tively) in the International Coordinating
Committee that was elected.98
The ILPS supposes to be a mass move-
ment, independent of political parties, gov-
ernments and religions, coordinating the
activity of workers, unions and organiza-
tions of women, youth, peasants, journalists,
writers, scientists and popular movements,
and campaigns connected with its goals. It
defines itself as ‘an anti-imperialist and
democratic formation’ with ‘a broad mass
character’, aiming to ‘coordinate the demo-
                                                




cratic struggles internationally and fights
among others for the following99:
‘National and social liberation from
imperialism and all reaction; human rights
against state violence, class exploitation, fas-
cism and religious bigotry; peace, against
wars of aggression and mass destroying
weapons; independent trade union and
workers’ rights against mass unemployment;
agrarian reform; the rights of women, youth,
children, indigenous people, teachers, re-
searchers; the rights of people to health care;
environmental protection; arts and culture
and the free flow of information.’100
This makes the League a streamlined
anti-globalization movement. It stresses its
opposition to multinational companies and
international agencies like the IMF, World
Bank, WTO, etc. However, it avoids the term
‘globalization’, preferring ‘imperialism’ or at
most ‘imperialist globalization’. This ties in
with the view of the ILPS founder, Professor
Sison: “Globalization is a slick and shallow
term. It glosses over the reality of modern
imperialism or monopoly capitalism… Cor-
porate executives, bureaucrats, bourgeois
academic pedants and imperialist-funded
NGOs have circulated the term globalization
as if it meant a new shiny and amazing
thing.’101 Radical movements such as that
often scorn Western-led anti-globalization
movements and events. Movements in the
South may even evaluate the efforts of or-
ganizations like the Porto Alegre Social Fo-
rum as acting ‘in favour of imperialist
“globalization”, to give a cosmetic layer on
the woes and miseries of the working people
around the globe, and so-called
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“humanization” of the capitalist plan of ex-
ploitations are the end result of the
meets.’102
In Europe and North America, there is
quite wide acceptance of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) as an alternative to
party politics, but in the developing, aid-
receiving countries of Asia, NGOs are seen
as parasites or ‘direct agencies of the multi-
national capital’. They may own telecom
companies, banks and leasing companies,
they have stakes in housing, marketing and
the food industry, and they manage aid proj-
ects and get revenue from them. (This takes
aid money back to the developed countries
again.)103
The World Social Forum in Brazil has
been criticized on these grounds, while the
Porto Alegre forum was called ‘an NGO
Olympics’ designed ‘to legitimize and swal-
low the poison of “globalization”’.104
The Asian Social Forum
The Second World Social Forum105 set out to
inspire social movements to organize re-
gional, local and ‘thematic’ social forums,
several of which have taken place in 2002
and 2003, including Asian Social Forum
(ASF) in Hyderabad, India, on January 2–7,
2003. Some 4000 participants dealt there
with the following topics:
* Peace and security.
* Debt, development, trade, finance and
investment.
* Nation-state, democracy and exclusions.
* Social infrastructure.
* Ecology, culture and knowledge.
* Alternatives and peoples movement.
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The criterion for participation was
‘opposition to imperialist globalization, as
well as [to] religious sectarian violence, and
commitment to democratic values, plurality
and peace.’106 The main document issued at
the ASF was the Statement of the Asian So-
cial, Mass and Peoples Movements and Or-
ganizations. It is worth quoting some char-
acteristic parts of the statement:
‘Today the whole of Asia is yet again at
the centre of poverty, war and intolerance,
with the mass of people facing starvation,
impoverishment, displacement, indebted-
ness, and destruction of livelihoods…
‘The impacts of capitalism and neolib-
eral globalization… are leading to wide-
spread increases in the levels of poverty and
widening gaps between the rich and poor. It
has also led to the increasing degradation of
the environment and ecology… The com-
bined actions of the World Bank, IMF, ADB,
export credit agencies, ODAs and WTO are
wilfully and deliberately undermining our
economic and political sovereignty while
destroying local and national economies.
Debt continues to be used by the interna-
tional financial institutions and donor
countries to keep our countries in financial
and economic bondage…
‘Capitalism and neo-liberal globaliza-
tion… have led to the depression of wages,
mass unemployment and price increases
making people more destitute, leading to
tragic consequences like increase in child
labour and trafficking in women and chil-
dren… We believe that not only is Another
World Possible107 but that Another World is
Necessary!’108
* * * * *
                                                
106 http://www.forumsocialmundial.org
107 This has been the main international slogan of the
social forum movement since 2001.
108 http://www.wsfindia.org
